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 These are appeals under the formal procedure, pursuant to   
G.L. c. 58A, § 7 and G.L. c. 59, §§ 64 and 65, from the refusal 
of the Board of Assessors of the City of Boston (the “assessors” 
or “appellee”) to abate taxes on certain personal property in 
the City of Boston owned by and assessed to the NSTAR Electric 
Company (the “appellant” or “NSTAR”) under G.L. c. 59, §§ 11, 
18, and 38, for fiscal years 2012 and 2013. 
 Chairman Hammond heard these appeals.  Commissioners 
Scharaffa, Rose, Chmielinski, and Good joined him in the 
decisions for the appellee.   
These findings of fact and report are promulgated pursuant 
to the appellant’s request under G.L. c. 58A, § 13 and 831 CMR 
1.32. 
 
 Daniel J. Finnegan, Esq. and Michael D. Roundy, Esq. for 
the appellant. 
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 David L. Klebanoff, Esq. and Nicholas Ariniello, Esq. for 
the appellee. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND REPORT 
 
 These appeals involved fourteen days of trial, testimony 
from eight witnesses, including three experts and two rebuttal 
witnesses who had testified in the appellant’s case-in-chief, 
the introduction of over forty exhibits, and two stipulations of 
agreed facts with additional exhibits attached.  The parties 
also jointly submitted an appendix that contains a compendium of 
pertinent regulatory decisions or relevant portions of them by 
the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (the “DPU”), or 
its predecessor, from 1993 to 2011, plus one each from the 
Washington State Utilities and Transportation Commission, the 
New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission, and the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (the “FERC”).1  The parties also 
submitted both post-trial and reply briefs, and requests for 
findings of fact.  The appellant additionally submitted a 
request for rulings of law.
2
  Based on all of the evidence, the 
Appellate Tax Board (the “Board”) made the following findings of 
fact.     
                                                          
1 For a number of reasons, the page numbers assigned to the DPU decisions in 
the compendium do not necessarily correspond to those on the website 
(http://web1.env.state.ma.us/DPU/FileRoom/dockets/bynumber) from which the 
parties accessed the decisions. 
2 At the close of the appellant’s case-in-chief, the assessors filed a motion 
for a directed verdict on the ground that the appellant was not entitled to 
relief because it failed to timely file a “true list” for its personal 
property located in Boston, in accordance with G.L. c. 59, § 29, for both 
fiscal years at issue and the assessments for those fiscal years did not 
exceed 150% of the values put forth by the appellant.  The Board took this 
motion under advisement and later ruled that it was moot given that the 
decisions in these appeals were for the appellee.       
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Introduction 
 On January 1, 2011 and January 1, 2012, NSTAR was the 
assessed owner of personal property situated in Boston.  NSTAR 
is a public electric utility that serves 81 communities in 
Massachusetts, including Boston, and is regulated by the DPU and 
FERC.  As of January 1, 2011 and January 1, 2012, NSTAR served a 
total of 1,157,000 and 1,163,000 customers, respectively, with 
302,153 and 304,057 customers located within Boston, 
respectively.    
The personal property at issue consists of electric utility 
transmission and distribution property placed at various 
locations throughout the City (the “subject property”).  As of 
the relevant valuation and assessment dates, NSTAR reported that 
the subject property consisted of the categories and quantities 
summarized in the table below. 
 Fiscal Year 
2012 
 
Fiscal Year 
2013 
Poles     50,488  44,230 
Circuit miles of overhead lines        414     419 
Circuit miles of underground lines      1,641   1,678 
Circuit miles of conduit      1,598   1,634 
Services    102,656  94,404 
Transformers     12,337  12,424 
Meters    302,153 304,057 
Street lights     25,791  25,625 
   
The subject property reported and valued by NSTAR did not 
include so-called construction work in progress (“CWIP”), but it 
did include completed construction not yet classified.  As of 
the relevant valuation and assessment dates, NSTAR reported the 
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total gross cost, the total depreciation, and the total net book 
cost of the subject property as summarized in the table below. 
 Fiscal Year 
2012 
 
Fiscal Year 
2013 
Total gross original cost $1,605,629,710 $1,655,852,137 
Total depreciation $  450,700,003 $  473,739,050 
Total net book cost $1,154,929,707 $1,182,113,087 
 
NSTAR did not maintain or report separate accounts booking 
the depreciation of its property located in Boston.  NSTAR’s 
depreciation is based on multiplying a systems-wide average 
depreciation rate for all of NSTAR’s Massachusetts property by 
the gross original cost of the property. 
 The methodology implemented by the assessors for valuing 
the subject property consisted of an equal weighting of the net 
book cost reported by NSTAR coupled with the replacement cost 
new less physical depreciation of the subject property.  For 
fiscal year 2012, the assessors valued the subject property at 
$1,586,035,900 and assessed a tax thereon at the commercial rate 
of $31.92 per $1,000 in the amount of $50,626,265.93.  For 
fiscal year 2013, the assessors valued the subject property at 
$1,634,648,000 and assessed a tax thereon at the commercial rate 
of $31.96 per $1,000 in the amount of $52,243,350.08.   
Jurisdiction 
In accordance with G.L. 59, § 57A, the appellant timely 
paid the tax due for both fiscal years at issue without 
incurring interest.  Based on the appellant’s timely payment of 
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the personal property taxes and the jurisdictional information 
summarized in the following table, the Board found and ruled 
that, in accordance with         G.L. c. 59, §§ 59 and 64-65, it 
had jurisdiction over these appeals. 
 Tax Bill 
Mailed 
Abatement 
Application Filed 
Abatement 
Application Denied 
 
Petition 
Filed 
Fiscal Year 2012 12/31/2011 01/31/2012     03/12/2012 06/11/2012 
Fiscal Year 2013 12/31/2012 01/31/2013     02/14/2013 05/13/2013 
    
Regulatory and Legal Setting 
 
As set out in Boston Gas Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 458 
Mass. 715, 717-19 (2011) (“Boston Gas/SJC”) - the Supreme 
Judicial Court’s latest pronouncement on valuing regulated 
utility property for ad valorem tax purposes - the assessors 
must value taxable property at its fair cash value, pursuant to 
G.L. c. 59, § 38.  This statute dictates that a property’s “fair 
market value” is “̒the price an owner willing but not under 
compulsion to sell ought to receive from one willing but not 
under compulsion to buy.’”  Boston Gas/SJC at 717 (quoting 
Boston Gas Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 334 Mass. 549, 566 
(1956)).  “When challenging an assessment before the Board, the 
burden rests on the taxpayer to establish its right to an 
abatement of the assessed tax.”  Boston Gas/SJC at 717 (citing 
Schlaiker v. Assessors of Great Barrington, 365 Mass. 243, 245 
(1974)(quoting Judson Freight Forwarding Co. v. Commonwealth, 
242 Mass. 47, 55 (1922))).  The assessment is presumed valid 
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unless the taxpayer sustains its burden of proving otherwise.  
Boston Gas/SJC at 717 (citing Schlaiker, 365 Mass. at 245). 
 Some of the methods used to value taxable utility property 
include: (1) a determination of the property’s net book value; 
(2) an income-capitalization valuation; (3) a sales-comparison 
valuation; (4) a determination of reproduction cost new less 
depreciation (“RCNLD”); (5) or a blending of these approaches.  
Boston Gas/SJC at 717 (citing Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. 
Assessors of Agawam, 428 Mass. 261, 263 (1998)(citing Montaup 
Elec. Co. v. Assessors of Whitman, 390 Mass. 847, 850 (1984))); 
see also Boston Edison Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 402 Mass. 1, 
13 (1988) (“Boston Edison Co.”).    
 The DPU regulates the rates that electric companies charge 
consumers.  “The net book value of the regulated utility 
company, also known as the ‘rate base’ value, plays an important 
role in the DPU’s calculation of the revenue that a regulated 
electric utility is permitted to earn.”  Boston Gas/SJC at 717-
18 (citing Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 428 Mass. at 263).  “The 
DPU allows a utility to recover, through the rates charged to 
consumers, its reasonable operating expenses, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization, and other costs.”  Boston Gas/SJC 
at 718 (citing Boston Gas Co. v. Department of Telecomm. & 
Energy, 436 Mass. 233, 234 (2002), quoting Theory and 
Implementation of Incentive Regulation, D.P.U. 94-158 at 3 
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(1995); Boston Gas Co., D.T.E. 03-40-B at 13-20 (2004) (breaking 
out the components of Boston Gas’s revenue requirements)).  “A 
utility is also permitted to earn a reasonable return on 
investment, which is calculated as a percentage return on the 
utility’s rate base.”  Boston Gas/SJC at 718 (citing Boston Gas 
Co. v. Department of Telecomm. & Energy, 436 Mass. at 234; 
Boston Gas Co., D.T.E. 03-40-B at 16 (calculating return on rate 
base for company)).  “The cost of utility property may be 
included in the utility’s rate base if the property is ̒used and 
useful’ to customers and if the costs were ̒prudently 
incurred.’”  Boston Gas/SJC at 718 (citing Hingham v. Department 
of Telecomm. & Energy, 433 Mass. 198, 202 (2001)).  “For 
ratemaking purposes, the value of property included in the rate 
base is its net book value, which has been defined as “̒the 
original cost of the property at the time it was originally 
devoted to public use, less accrued depreciation.’”  Boston 
Gas/SJC at 718 (quoting Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 428 Mass. at 
263).   
 “In the context of a sale of utility assets, the DPU has 
maintained a general policy of limiting the net book value of 
assets in the hands of the buyer to the existing net book value 
in the hands of the seller.”  Boston Gas/SJC at 718 (citing 
Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 428 Mass. at 263).  “In this way, 
any acquisition premium paid for the assets – that is, an amount 
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paid above net book value – would be excluded from the buyer’s 
rate base, and the buyer would thus not earn the DPU-specified 
rate of return on the premium; as of 2003, the DPU stated that 
such exclusion remains the norm.”  Boston Gas/SJC at 718 (citing 
Boston Gas Co., D.T.E. 03-40 at 323 (2003)).  “This policy has 
been referred to as the ̒carry-over rate base principle.’”  
Boston Gas/SJC at 718 (citing Montaup Elec. Co., 390 Mass. at 
852-53).   
The Supreme Judicial Court has stated that “the net book 
value of utility assets is the proper value for assessment 
purposes, absent ̒special circumstances’ that would induce a 
buyer to pay more than net book values.”  Boston Gas/SJC at 718-
19 (citing Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 428 Mass. at 263-64).  
“Such circumstances may include (1) that ̒the utility company’s 
net earnings actually may exceed the rate of return approved by 
the regulatory agency’; (2) that ̒the profit available from this 
transaction may exceed that which an investment of comparable 
risk could bring in the open market’; (3) that ̒the applicable 
regulatory agency may change its policies and abandon the carry-
over rate base principle, thereby making an investment in the 
company more attractive’; or (4) ̒[t]he potential for growth in 
a utility’s business.’”  Boston Gas/SJC at 719 (quoting Boston 
Edison Co. v. Assessors of Watertown, 387 Mass. 298, 305-06 
(1982)(“Watertown”)).  “The special circumstances that could 
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induce a buyer to pay more than net book value are not limited 
to the examples enumerated above.”  Boston Gas/SJC at 719 
(citing Watertown at 306).  These “circumstances” are often 
referred to, and are referenced hereinafter, as Watertown 
factors.   
In Boston Gas Co. v. Assessors of Boston, Mass. ATB 
Findings of Fact and Reports 2009-1195 (“Boston Gas/Board”), the 
Board reviewed numerous cases and transactions that “illustrated 
the development of Massachusetts regulatory policy [since 
Watertown] and the move away from a strict carryover-rate-base 
valuation model.”  Id. at 2009-1278.  The following three 
paragraphs summarize the Board’s review, analysis, and 
conclusions relating to the then existing regulatory and legal 
landscape as of fiscal year 2004, the fiscal year at issue in 
Boston Gas/Board.   
First, the Board in Boston Gas/Board noted that in Boston 
Edison Co., the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Board’s 
blended approach to valuation that reflected “a prudent purchase 
price above the plant’s net book.”  Boston Edison Co., 402 Mass. 
at 15.  Next, the Board in Boston Gas/Board observed that in 
Boston Edison Co. v. Assessors of Everett, Mass. ATB Findings of 
Fact and Reports 1996-759 (“Boston Edison/Everett”), it reviewed 
“the regulatory environment for and potential purchasers of 
electric utilities,” id. at 813, and after an extensive review 
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that included federal regulatory precedent, various DPU 
decisions, and the Court’s decision in Boston Edison Co., and 
after noting the DPU’s departure from its prior adherence to 
cost-based rate determinations, the Board in Boston 
Edison/Everett valued that regulated electric utility property 
on a two-to-one ratio of depreciated replacement cost to net 
book cost.   
The Board in Boston Gas/Board then noted that shortly after 
the Board’s decision in Boston Edison/Everett, the Supreme 
Judicial Court reviewed and affirmed the DPU’s valuation, under 
G.L. c. 164, § 43, of an electricity distribution system using 
an equal weighting of RCNLD and original cost less depreciation 
methodologies.  See Stowe Municipal Electric Department v. 
Department of Public Utilities, 426 Mass. 341, 345-46 (1998) 
(“Stowe”).  The Board in Boston Gas/Board further observed that 
the Court, in affirming the DPU’s decision in Stowe, commented 
on how the DPU had “recently changed from a mandatory rule 
always limiting a buyer of utility property to the seller’s rate 
base to a case-by-case determination.”  Id. at 347.  The Board 
in Boston Gas/Board also noted that shortly thereafter, in 
Attorney General v. Department of Telecommunications and Energy, 
Boston Edison Company, et al., 438 Mass. 256 (2002) (“Nstar”), 
the Supreme Judicial Court considered the appeal of a DPU 
decision that allowed the recovery of an acquisition premium in 
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the merger that created NSTAR.  The Court recognized the DPU’s 
relatively new policy that “merger-related costs [are 
recoverable] where consolidation and recovery of costs will 
serve the ‘public interest,’ [as] set forth in D.P.U. 93-167-A 
(1994) (“Mergers and Acquisitions”),” and that this policy 
reversed DPU’s previous policy of per se disallowance of 
acquisition premiums in favor of a case-by-case determination 
using the “public interest” standard.  Id. at 261-62.   
From its review of these cases and DPU decisions, the Board 
in Boston Gas/Board concluded that DPU policy had indeed changed 
since Watertown, rendering the value of regulated utility 
property greater than its mere carry-over rate base.  The Board 
catalogued these policy changes as including: adjustments in the 
purchaser’s rate base for prudently incurred purchase costs 
above the plant’s net book cost; consideration of acquisition 
premium cost recovery on a case-by-case basis; determining that 
an equal weighting of RCNLD and net book cost met the “fair 
value” standard under G.L. c. 164, § 43; and the adoption of 
performance-based rates that permitted a utility operating 
efficiently to achieve a level of profitability not allowed 
under the traditional cost-based formula.  Boston Gas/Board, 
Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 2009-12. 
In reviewing the Board’s analysis of the regulatory and 
legal landscape in Boston Gas/Board, the Supreme Judicial Court 
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in Boston Gas/SJC affirmed the “board’s findings that changes in 
the regulatory environment for utilities justified the use of a 
valuation method other than net book value.”  Boston Gas/SJC, 
458 Mass. at 722.  The Court stated that in Boston Edison Co., 
402 Mass. at 13, “we held that the board reasonably saw, based 
on a prior decision of the DPU upheld by this court, ‘the 
possibility that the [DPU] might allow adjustments in a 
purchaser’s rate base to reflect a prudent purchase price above 
the plant’s net book cost.’”  The Court also recognized the 
DPU’s formal “shift in its policy with respect to the carry-over 
rate base principle in a 1994 order,” Boston Gas/SJC, 458 Mass. 
at 722, and that “[t]he ruling appeared to contemplate the 
possibility both of a return of the acquisition premium – for 
example, as a recoverable cost to the company – and a return on 
the acquisition premium by including it in the acquirer’s rate 
base.”  Id. at 723 (emphasis added).   The Court pointed out 
that it had acknowledged the DPU’s regulatory change “from a 
mandatory carry-over rate base policy to a case-by-case 
approach” in Stowe, 426 Mass. at 347, and had affirmed the DPU’s 
approval of a rate plan which allowed the recovery of an 
acquisition premium paid to consummate a merger in Nstar, 438 
Mass. at 258.     
In sum, the Court allowed that “[t]hese cases and DPU 
orders amply demonstrate the type of regulatory change 
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anticipated in [Watertown], justifying the use of a valuation 
methodology other than net book value.”  Boston Gas/SJC, 458 
Mass. at 724.  The Court went on to pronounce that “[t]he DPU 
has declared its abandonment of a strict carry-over rate base 
policy, this court has repeatedly and recently acknowledged that 
policy change, and the DPU has, in practice, allowed the 
recovery of a premium in a utility merger.”  Id.  Lastly, the 
Court, in a footnote, “also agree[d] with the board that the 
DPU’s adoption of ‘performance-based rates’ . . . could 
contribute to a buyer’s willingness to pay more than net book 
value for rate regulated utility property.”  Id. at 724 n. 17. 
This background begs the threshold question in these 
appeals: whether any of these or similar circumstances - which 
militate against relying solely on net book value to value the 
subject property - existed as of the relevant valuation and 
assessment dates for these appeals.   
The Appellant’s Case-in-Chief 
 
 The appellant introduced thirty exhibits into evidence, 
including FERC financial reports, depreciation studies, pole 
studies, expert reports, several forms of list, documents 
pertaining to the merger of Northeast Utilities and NSTAR (the 
“NSTAR/NU merger”), certain SEC Form 10-Ks, discounted cash flow 
analyses, a weighted average cost of capital study, and a DPU 
Decision.  The appellant also called five witnesses to testify, 
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including two expert witnesses who additionally testified in 
rebuttal. 
 The appellant’s first three witnesses - Michael Farrell, 
Jay Buth, and Jeffrey R. Cahoon - were all executives with 
Northeast Utilities.  Mr. Farrell was the company’s Director of 
Revenue and Regulatory Accounting; Mr. Buth, a Vice-President, 
was the company’s Controller and Chief Accounting Officer; and 
Mr. Cahoon, also a Vice-President, was in charge of the 
company’s Business Financial Services and Corporate Performance 
Management. 
Michael Farrell 
Mr. Farrell primarily testified about the nature and extent 
of the subject property, its original cost and accumulated 
depreciation, NSTAR’s system-wide depreciation methodology, 
CWIP, contributions in aid of construction, and regulatory 
assets, as well as the treatment of NSTAR’s personal property in 
transactions.    Mr. Farrell testified that NSTAR commissions a 
study to determine the depreciation to apply to its utility 
plant assets, which it last did in 2005.  According to Mr. 
Farrell, the study is based on NSTAR’s actual experience, as 
well as interviews, observations, and the study expert’s general 
industry knowledge.  The study is then used to determine average 
service lives so customers are paying for the assets over the 
assets’ service lives.  The depreciation rates reflect recovery 
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for not only the installed cost but also the cost of removal, 
minus any scrap recovery.  Mr. Farrell also testified about the 
process for recovering and writing off as an expense so-called 
regulatory assets - such as pension plan expenses and storm 
costs - over the time it takes to collect the costs from 
customers.   Mr. Farrell did not consider regulatory assets to 
be tangible property. 
Jay Buth   
Mr. Buth testified about the accounting treatment and 
purchase price allocation of the regulated physical plant assets 
and the goodwill associated with the NSTAR/NU merger.  He stated 
that the merger was an enterprise transaction in which the fair 
value of the regulated distribution and transmission property 
was determined to be the property’s net book value and the 
amount paid over that value - the acquisition premium - was for 
accounts receivable, cash, the trained and experienced work 
force, the management, and the business acumen and expertise of 
management.  He further testified that the acquisition premium 
was booked as goodwill, an intangible asset, at the holding 
company level and was not incorporated into the rate base for 
NSTAR. 
Jeffrey R. Cahoon        
Mr. Cahoon testified about the nature of and rationales for 
the NSTAR/NU merger, the anticipated benefits to ratepayers, the 
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merger settlement agreements, and DPU’s and other authorities’ 
approval of the merger.  According to Mr. Cahoon, the rationale 
for the NSTAR/NU merger included increased financial strength 
and geographic diversity, improved presence in the regulatory 
area, combining complementary strengths, and sharing best 
practices.  Mr. Cahoon testified that, throughout the NSTAR/NU 
merger discussions to which he was privy, the value of the 
companies’ tangible physical assets exceeding their net book 
value was never broached. 
In addition to the three witnesses from Northeast 
Utilities, the appellant called two expert witnesses – John Reed 
and David Moody. 
John Reed      
John Reed, whom the Board qualified as an expert in 
regulatory, economic, and financial matters relating to 
utilities, testified and reported on valuation principles 
relating to regulated utility property; the status and nature of 
cost-of-service regulation in Massachusetts by the DPU and FERC, 
regulatory changes including performance-based ratemaking, and 
revenue decoupling mechanisms; the effect of industry 
consolidation on utility asset valuation; and the distinctions 
between the value of physical utility plant assets and the value 
of entire utility enterprises.  More particularly, Mr. Reed 
opined that none of the factors set forth in Watertown that 
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might lead a potential purchaser of NSTAR’s personal property in 
Boston to pay more than the net book cost of such property 
existed as of the relevant valuation and assessment dates here.  
Consequently, he concluded that there were no special 
circumstances applicable to the subject property that would 
warrant a departure from using net book value as the appropriate 
measure of value for ad valorem tax purposes.   
Mr. Reed based his conclusion that special circumstances 
did not exist in these appeals on his analysis of the nature and 
impact of utility regulation in Massachusetts by the DPU and 
FERC.  According to Mr. Reed, under traditional cost-of-service 
regulation, it is the net book value of the assets that goes 
into the rate base on which an authorized return is calculated.  
This return includes the recovery of interest on debt used to 
finance the investment in the assets, as well as an allowed 
profit on the equity portion of that investment.  The company’s 
revenue requirement formula also provides for the recovery of 
the operating expenses of the utility, the depreciation expense 
by which the original investment is returned, and an amount 
intended to cover the payment of income taxes.  Accordingly, 
under traditional cost-of-service regulation, utilities are 
allowed to earn their cost of doing business as well as a 
reasonable opportunity to earn an authorized return on the 
assets used to provide the regulated utility service.  In 
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addition, regulators have employed alternative regulatory 
frameworks, such as performance-based ratemaking (“PBR”), which 
is designed to incentivize efficient operation of a utility 
system by providing the utility an opportunity to earn more than 
its allowed return on equity.  NSTAR’s PBR plan was terminated 
effective December 31, 2011.      Mr. Reed testified that “at 
present,” that is, as of the date of his testimony, there were 
no electric utility PBRs in Massachusetts, and, at any rate, he 
did not believe that they affected the value of utility assets.   
Mr. Reed also discussed revenue decoupling mechanisms in 
Massachusetts as a means for insulating utilities from the 
effects of changes in sales volume, particularly those arising 
from efficiency programs and conservation measures.  According 
to     Mr. Reed, revenue decoupling helps insure utility 
earnings at the allowed return but not above it, and therefore 
does not affect the value of utility assets.   
In addition to the effects of the regulatory environment in 
Massachusetts, Mr. Reed examined the regulatory scheme 
applicable to transmission assets under FERC.  He reported that 
similar to Massachusetts regulation, FERC has historically 
relied on cost-of-service regulation, where the allowed rate of 
return is applied to the net book value of plant assets.  While 
the rates of return under FERC have been higher than those 
allowed under the state’s jurisdiction, those returns reflect 
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the higher risks associated with transmission investments.  
Nonetheless, he asserted that in the context of valuing the 
assets for ad valorem tax purposes, since the allowed return is 
calculated as a return on the net book value of the assets, it 
is that net book value that establishes the fair market value of 
those assets.  Mr. Reed further maintained that even though FERC 
has implemented certain incentives on a case-by-case basis in 
recent years, the allowed returns have been set at rates equal 
to what may be earned on similar investments of what it deems a 
comparable risk.  Those rates of return have been applied to the 
net plant for determination of revenues.  As a result, Mr. Reed 
stated that the net book value is the appropriate method for 
valuing NSTAR’s FERC-regulated assets. 
Apart from the regulatory environment, Mr. Reed also 
provided his opinion on the effect of utility-industry 
consolidation on the value of utility assets.  In the case of 
the NSTAR/NU merger,      Mr. Reed identified the drivers in 
that transaction as including greater diversification of markets 
and regulatory risk, enhancement of the combined companies’ 
financial strength, improved ability to support needed 
infrastructure investments and to withstand economic volatility, 
providing geographic diversity and mutual support during storms 
or service disruption, and bringing together complementary 
strengths of the two companies to identify and implement best 
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practices across the merged company.  He referred to some other 
reasons as including an increased voice in the development of 
national energy policy, an enhanced technical expertise through 
a broader and more diverse work force, and a better ability to 
make investments in new technologies and renewable energy.   
Mr. Reed distinguished enterprise sales from transactions 
involving only transmission and distribution property (“asset 
transactions”).  He testified that he was not aware of any asset 
transactions involving transmission and distribution property 
comparable to NSTAR’s system occurring in New England, and while 
he was aware of some asset sales in other parts of the country, 
he stated that those “did not tend to take place at a price 
above book value.”  He also testified that when an acquisition 
premium - an amount paid for an enterprise above the net book 
value of the identifiable assets of the enterprise - is paid, 
such premiums are not allocable to individual assets and are not 
part of the asset value.  Instead they are accounted for as an 
element of goodwill and are not included in the rate base 
because they are considered an intangible asset.     Mr. Reed 
testified that after values are assigned to identifiable assets, 
what is left over is goodwill, that is the value which is not 
attributable to any other asset.  According to Mr. Reed, 
acquisition premiums are paid because it is anticipated that the 
merger of the two enterprises will result in an improved 
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financial position or operating efficiencies that create cost 
savings.  Mr. Reed posited that mergers are driven by management 
acumen and synergies in the transaction that create cost 
savings. 
David Moody                                 
David Moody, whom the Board qualified as an expert in 
appraising regulated public utility property, testified 
primarily about the content of and support for the values that 
he derived in his appraisal report, which was admitted into 
evidence.  The appraisal report provides an overview of the 
relevant valuation principles upon which he relied and also 
contains the various valuation methodologies that he considered 
or used to estimate the value of the subject property for the 
fiscal years at issue.  These methodologies were the sales-
comparison approach, the income approach, and the cost approach. 
In his sales-comparison approach, Mr. Moody first reviewed 
sources for the direct sale of electric utility systems and 
found none comparable.  He then examined the NSTAR/NU merger and 
the payment terms, which involved an exchange of common stock.  
He determined that the relationship between the value of the 
common stock and the physical assets was “tenuous” because he 
believed that the value of the stock was subject to many other 
factors, including: the value of the debt; the overall status of 
the stock market; the ratio of debt to equity; the expertise of 
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management in directing the overall company; and NSTAR’s 
ownership of another operating entity, NSTAR Gas Company.  
Moreover, he reported that “investors that purchase stock are 
looking for intellectual or intangible assets that create value 
above and beyond that of the physical assets       . . . . [such 
as] business acumen, the potential for growth, or some other 
identifiable intangible asset.”   
Mr. Moody cited to and quoted various documents created or 
published in connection with the merger, which indicated that 
the DPU’s approval of the NSTAR/NU merger was based on economic 
benefits accruing to ratepayers, such as a $12 million rate 
credit, a four-year base distribution freeze, and lower rates 
after 2015 than without the NSTAR/NU merger, as well as a lack 
of harm.  Mr. Moody reported that the companies’ rationales for 
the NSTAR/NU merger included: improved technical expertise; a 
broader, deeper, and more diverse workforce; better ability to 
invest in and deploy new technologies; improved service quality; 
increased voice in the development of national energy policy; 
greater diversification of markets and regulatory risk; and 
enhanced financial strength and flexibility.  Mr. Moody 
concluded that the DPU’s requirement that a share of any 
identifiable savings accruing from the NSTAR/NU merger be passed 
to ratepayers and that an analysis of NSTAR’s rate of return be 
conducted to ensure that the NSTAR/NU merger does not lead to 
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any excess savings indicated that the NSTAR/NU merger did not 
increase the value of the subject property.  Mr. Moody stressed 
that the amount by which the purchase price exceeded the fair 
value of the identifiable tangible and intangible (what he 
termed “regulatory”) assets represented the value of the 
goodwill that the merger created, and that goodwill is an 
intangible asset and not taxable or recoverable.  As stated in 
his report, so-called regulatory assets, however, are charged to 
utility customers and paid over time.    
Mr. Moody also examined five transactions within the most 
recent five years of large regulated utilities that he deemed 
similar to the NSTAR/NU merger.  These transactions included: 
(1) the merger of Allegheny Energy into FirstEnergy in a stock 
swap valued at $4.4 billion; (2a) the acquisition of Aguila’s 
Colorado electricity assets and its natural gas assets in the 
states of Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, and Nebraska to Black Hills 
for $940 million cash; (2b) the acquisition of Aquila’s Missouri 
electric utility operations by Great Plains Energy for $1.7 
billion cash and stock; (3) the acquisition of Energy East by 
Iberdrola for $4.5 billion cash for stock; (4) the acquisition 
of Maine & Maritimes by Emera for $80 million cash for stock; 
and (5) the acquisition of Puget Energy by a consortium of 
investors led by Maquarie Group for $3.2 billion cash for stock.  
Mr. Moody observed that in each of these transactions, the 
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allocation of the purchase price to the regulated assets was 
based on those assets’ original cost less depreciation.   
Mr. Moody developed a discounted-cash-flow (“DCF”) 
methodology for his income approach.  In his opinion, it was the 
more appropriate method for measuring the present value of 
future cash flows when compared to a direct capitalization 
method.  As he explained, DCF is based on a detailed projection 
of expected revenues and expenses, required capital expenses, 
and the effects of income taxes.  Each future year’s net income 
is discounted from that year to the valuation and appraisal date 
using a discount factor that is based on the market cost of 
capital.  He found DCF to be particularly useful when wide 
variations exist from year to year in income and income tax 
liability.  He also asserted that it is the method used by 
buyers and sellers in the marketplace for decision-making. 
Mr. Moody’s DCF methodology valued NSTAR’s entire system or 
enterprise because that is how NSTAR records its operating and 
financial data.  As a result, it was necessary for Mr. Moody to 
perform an allocation to determine the value of the subject 
property.  To find his earnings approach indicator to the market 
value of NSTAR in total, he relied on NSTAR’s annual report to 
FERC, in which all financial results are reported, and then 
projected them forward for a number of years into the future and 
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then discounted back to the appraisal date each year’s results 
at what he claimed was a market derived discount factor. 
To determine his discount factor or rate, Mr. Moody 
reported that he relied on publicly available financial 
information for stocks of large publicly traded electric utility 
holding companies listed in industry sources.  The net-operating 
income that he used in his analysis did not include an allowance 
for property taxes that he instead included in his adjusted 
discount factor.  The resulting overall discount factor, based 
on compounding the average millage rate for NSTAR of 3.192 
percent with the weighted average cost of capital (“WACC”), 
based on the cost of Baa rated debt,
3
 of 7.530 percent for fiscal 
year 2012 and 7.479 percent for fiscal year 2013, is 9.58 
percent and 9.53 percent, respectively.  The results of his DCF 
analysis, incorporating assumptions on revenue, operating and 
maintenance costs, and the discount factor produced an income 
approach indicator for the NSTAR system as a whole of 
$4,483,783,631 for fiscal year 2012 and $4,472,132,309 for 
fiscal year 2013. 
In his RCNLD approach, Mr. Moody first trended the actual 
(original) costs of construction from the year of the subject 
property’s installation to current price levels, as of the 
relevant valuation and assessment dates, using the Handy-Whitman 
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Index of Public Utility Construction Costs (“Handy-Whitman Cost 
Index”) for the entire NSTAR Electric system and the facilities 
in Boston.  From those amounts, he subtracted all elements of 
depreciation – physical, functional, and economic or external.  
Mr. Moody defined physical depreciation as “the loss of value 
due to wear and tear, normal service and exposure to the 
elements” and its measure as “the decrease in the present worth 
of service remaining in the unit,” which can be ascertained by 
estimating “the remaining service compared to a new unit.”  He 
defined functional obsolescence “as a loss in value 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
3 “Baa” is a credit rating assigned by Moody’s, as a financial indicator to 
investors of debt securities such as bonds. 
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caused by factors inherent within the property itself that arise 
from changes in design materials or inefficient plant layouts, 
resulting in over or under capacity, lack of utility, or excess 
operating costs.”  He determined that the subject property 
exhibited no functional obsolescence.  Mr. Moody defined 
external or economic depreciation as the concept that “takes 
into account the existence of any factor outside of the property 
itself that affects or limits the value of that property in the 
marketplace.” Moreover, he noted “[t]he generally recognized 
method of measurement of the impact of external depreciation is 
to capitalize the income loss attributable to the negative 
influence.”  “In the case of utility property,” according to Mr. 
Moody, “the external depreciation stems from regulation of the 
property’s earnings.”  With respect to the subject property, Mr. 
Moody observed that NSTAR is subject to regulation by DPU, which 
limits the rates it can charge and the return that it can earn.  
Mr. Moody quantified external obsolescence by capitalizing the 
shortfall in earnings necessary to support the proposed 
investment.  The following tables summarize Mr. Moody’s 
calculation of external obsolescence. 
Fiscal Year 2012 
 NSTAR Electric 
Reproduction Cost New Less Physical and Functional Depreciation $6,889,561,711 
Required Levelized Earnings at 9.58% $  660,020,012 
Expected Levelized Earnings at 9.58% (Based on DCF Results) $  429,546,472 
Earnings Deficiency $  230,473,540 
Earnings Deficiency Capitalized at 9.58% - External Obsolescence $2,405,728,980 
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External Obsolescence Factor 35% 
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Fiscal Year 2013 
 NSTAR Electric 
Reproduction Cost New Less Physical and Functional Depreciation $7,391,309,187 
Required Levelized Earnings at 9.58% $  704,391,766 
Expected Levelized Earnings at 9.58% (Based on DCF Results) $  426,270,449 
Earnings Deficiency $  278,121,316 
Earnings Deficiency Capitalized at 9.58% - External Obsolescence $2,918,376,878 
External Obsolescence Factor 39% 
 
 The following tables summarize Mr. Moody’s RCNLD 
methodology, which incorporates external obsolescence. 
Fiscal Year 2012 
 NSTAR Electric Subject Property 
Reproduction Cost New (“RCN”) $12,351,565,744 $3,643,497,294 
Physical & Functional Depreciation ($ 5,462,004,034) ($1,584,313,346) 
RCN Less Physical & Functional Depreciation $ 6,889,561,710 $2,059,183,947 
External Obsolescence @ 35% ($ 2,405,778,080) ($  719,050,037) 
RCN Less All Depreciation/Obsolescence $ 4,483,783,631 $1,340,133,910 
 
Fiscal Year 2013 
 NSTAR Electric Subject Property 
RCN $12,945,709,521 $3,643,497,294 
Physical & Functional Depreciation ($ 5,554,400,334) ($1,584,313,346) 
RCN Less Physical & Functional Depreciation $ 7,391,309,197 $2,059,183,947 
External Obsolescence @ 39% ($ 2,918,376,878) ($  840,805,382) 
RCN Less All Depreciation/Obsolescence $ 4,472,932,309 $1,315,105,855 
  
Mr. Moody also argued that since the revenues used to pay 
the cost of debt and return to investors of a public utility are 
regulated based primarily on the original cost less depreciation 
of property devoted to furnishing utility service, it follows 
that the earnings that any segment of the total property 
contributes to the total earnings of all of the property is in 
direct proportion to its rate base.  The following tables 
summarize what Mr. Moody found to be the rate base for the total 
of NSTAR’s electric property and that of the subject property. 
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Fiscal Year 2012 
 NSTAR Electric Subject Property 
Original Cost $5,510,231,273 $1,605,629,710 
Depreciation Reserve ($1,545,553,867) ($  450,700,003) 
Original Cost Less Depreciation $3,964,677,406 $1,154,929,707 
Rate Base $4,050,054,729 $1,154,929,707 
 
Fiscal Year 2013 
 NSTAR Electric Subject Property 
Original Cost $5,837,142,394 $1,665,582,137 
Depreciation Reserve ($1,637,258,106) ($  483,469,050) 
Original Cost Less Depreciation $4,199,984,288 $1,182,113,087 
Rate Base $4,360,464,623 $1,182,113,087 
 
 Mr. Moody further observed that while some of his value 
indicators are directly applicable to the subject property, such 
as original cost less depreciation, others require an allocation 
to measure the value that the subject property contributes to 
the value of the NSTAR Electric system as a whole.  The 
following tables summarize the factors that Mr. Moody analyzed 
in that regard. 
Fiscal Year 2012 
Factor NSTAR Electric Subject Property Ratio 
Revenue $2,642,359,170 $  662,823,834 25.1% 
RCN Less Phys. & Funct. Depreciation  $6,889,561,710 $2,059,183,947 29.9% 
RCN Less All Depreciation/Obsolescence $4,483,783,631 $1,340,133,910 29.9% 
Customers  1,157,000   264,888 22.9% 
Sales 24,853,397 6,642,584 26.7% 
Rate Base $4,050,054,729 $1,154,929,707 28.5% 
 
 Fiscal Year 2013 
Factor NSTAR Electric Subject Property Ratio 
Revenue $2,633,057,952 $  675,005,989 25.6% 
RCN Less Phys. & Funct. Depreciation  $7,391,309,187 $2,155,911,237 29.2% 
RCN Less All Depreciation/Obsolescence $4,472,932,309 $1,315,105,855 29.4% 
Customers  1,163,000   304,057 26.1% 
Sales 24,508,428 6,605,543 27.0% 
Rate Base $4,360,404,623 $1,182,113,087 27.1% 
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 For the adoption of a value indicator under his DCF income 
approach, Mr. Moody used the value derived for the NSTAR system 
as a whole and then applied an allocation factor to determine 
the contribution of the subject property.  His analyses are 
summarized in the tables below. 
Fiscal Year 2012 
DCF of NSTAR Electric $4,483,783,631 
Allocation Factor (Rate Base) 28.5% 
Value Indicator for Boston $1,277,878,335 
 
Fiscal Year 2013 
DCF of NSTAR Electric $4,472,132,309 
Allocation Factor (Rate Base) 27.1% 
Value Indicator for Boston $1,211,947,856 
 
 Before reconciling the various values that Mr. Moody 
derived for the subject property using his different 
methodologies, he reviewed and attempted to dispel six potential 
reasons why an investor might pay more than the indicated values 
for the subject property.  Those reasons included: 
(1) the purchaser is unregulated and not subject to 
earnings restrictions; 
(2) the actual return on the investment could be more than 
the allowed returns; 
(3) the actual return could be more than that offered by 
alternative investments of comparable risk; 
(4) there is a possibility of change in regulatory 
policies or governing law; 
(5) there is the possibility of extraordinary growth in 
the service area; and 
(6) the useful life of the subject property may exceed the 
depreciable life. 
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According to Mr. Moody: (1) there were no unregulated purchasers 
on the horizon; (2) the return was expected to stay within the 
range allowed by DPU; (3) if returns were found excessive, DPU 
would investigate the propriety of NSTAR’s rates; (4) no changes 
in regulatory or governing laws were anticipated; (5) 
projections indicate that only minimal growth is anticipated; 
and (6) the use of a depreciation floor accounts for the subject 
property’s useful life exceeding adopted depreciable lives. 
 For reconciliation purposes, the following tables summarize  
Mr. Moody’s value indicators. 
Fiscal Year 2012 
Value Indicators Results 
Sales Comparison Approach - 
Income Approach (DCF) $1,277,878,335 
Cost Approach (RCNLD) $1,340,133,910 
Original Cost Less Depreciation (Rate Base) $1,154,929,707 
 
Fiscal Year 2013 
Value Indicators Results 
Sales Comparison Approach - 
Income Approach (DCF) $1,211,947,856 
Cost Approach (RCNLD) $1,315,105,855 
Original Cost Less Depreciation (Rate Base) $1,182,113,087 
 
Mr. Moody found that the values derived from his DCF approach 
and the subject property’s net book value or rate base were the 
most relevant indicators of value.  However, under the existing 
regulatory circumstances, Mr. Moody considered the subject 
property’s net book value to be the strongest indicator of the 
subject property’s value and he gave it the most weight in 
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assigning a rounded value of $1,200,000,000 to the subject 
property for both fiscal years at issue.  
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The Assessors’ Case-in-Chief 
 The assessors’ case relied primarily on the testimony and 
appraisal report of George Sansoucy, their criticisms of NSTAR’s 
case, and their analysis of the regulatory setting and continued 
existence of Watertown factors and other special circumstances 
that could induce a buyer to pay more than net book value for 
the subject property.  Mr. Sansoucy considered multiple 
valuation approaches for valuing the subject property for the 
fiscal years at issue, including original cost less depreciation 
(net book), RCNLD, a comparable-sale method that produced 
various indicators, and several income approaches.  He 
ultimately chose the RCNLD methodology as his primary method of 
valuation for the subject special purpose property because it 
“comes the closest to a satisfactory method of appraisal.”  He 
then reconciled the value that he achieved from his cost 
approach with the values that he developed using income and 
comparable-sales approaches.  Once reconciled, he determined if 
it was appropriate to subtract any additional economic or 
functional obsolescence, as measured by the results of his 
income and market-sales approaches - from the physical and 
functional obsolescence that he found in his cost approach - to 
arrive at a final estimate of value. 
George Sansoucy 
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 Mr. Sansoucy’s first step in applying his cost approach was 
to calculate the cost new of the subject property.  To do that, 
he relied principally on the original or historic costs from 
NSTAR’s records for the FERC categories of property that 
comprised the subject property, and he then trended the costs 
from each of those categories with a factor obtained from a 
nationally recognized trend index - the Handy-Whitman Cost 
Index.  Mr. Sansoucy then considered the extent to which the 
three basic forms of depreciation – physical, functional, and 
economic – might apply.  With respect to functional 
obsolescence, he determined, like Mr. Moody, that the subject 
property “generally functions as it is designed to, and, 
therefore, does not suffer significant functional obsolescence.”  
In developing estimates for each category of the subject 
property’s useful lives, he considered their materials and 
designs, regulatory service lives, age, and observable 
condition.  He also maintained that he relied on several 
industry studies as well as independent studies that he 
performed on the useful lives of distribution poles.  The 
following table summarizes Mr. Sansoucy’s determination of 
useful lives for each FERC account that he decided was an 
appropriate category for the subject property. 
Mr. Sansoucy’s Estimated Useful Lives 
FERC Acct. AUS Acct. Description Estimated 
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Useful Life 
311 n/a 352-Structures & Improvements 90 
311 n/a 361–Structures & Improvements 90 
353 n/a Station Equipment 65 
354 n/a Towers & Fixtures 90 
355 n/a Poles & Fixtures 75 
356 n/a Overhead Conductors & Devices 75 
357 n/a Underground Conduit 75 
358 n/a Underground Conductors 75 
362 n/a Station Equipment 65 
364 n/a Poles, Towers & Fixtures 60 
365 n/a Overhead Conductors & Fixtures 60 
 
Mr. Sansoucy’s Estimated Useful Lives 
(continued) 
 
366 n/a Underground Conduit 60 
367 n/a Underground Conductors & Devices 60 
368 n/a Line Transformers 50 
369 n/a Services 50 
370 n/a Meters 30 
373 n/a 371-Installations on Customers’ Premises 40 
373 n/a Street Lighting & Signals 40 
315 n/a 397-Communication Equipment 30 
n/a 2123 397-Communication Equipment 10 
n/a 2124 397-Communication Equipment 7 
n/a 2220 397-Communication Equipment 10 
n/a 22312 397-Communication Equipment 30 
n/a 24212 397-Communication Equipment 30 
  
Because useful lives are not equivalent to absolute 
physical lives, Mr. Sansoucy applied a 20-percent floor for 
property still in use recognizing the cash flow that this 
property generates at any age and also its embedded value 
“representing a portion of cost for permitting, design, 
construction, placement, engineering, and other indirect costs 
associated with replacing a retired component.”  The following 
table summarizes the values that Mr. Sansoucy derived for the 
subject property using his reproduction cost new less physical 
and functional depreciation methodology, that he then compared 
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to values which he developed using sales-comparison and income 
approaches. 
Summary of Mr. Sansoucy’s Cost Approach 
Fiscal Year Original Cost RCN RCNLD 
2012 $1,748,956,889 $3,565,691,700 $2,338,260,300 
2013 $1,842,866,043 $3,838,470,900 $2,495,888,400 
 
 In discussing his sales-comparison approach, Mr. Sansoucy 
initially observed that NSTAR is the product of a consolidation 
of four utilities: Boston Edison, Cambridge Electric, Canal 
Electric, and Commonwealth Electric.  NSTAR was then itself 
purchased by NU as of April 10, 2012 and operates as a wholly 
owned subsidiary of NU, a utility holding company based in 
Berlin, Connecticut.  The announcement date of the sale was 
October 16, 2010.  The sale was a stock-for-stock swap and an 
assumption of debt. 
 For comparable sales, Mr. Sansoucy focused on seven utility 
sales analyzing what he considered to be relevant information in 
their publicly reported financial statements, news statements, 
and regulatory filings to separate and assign transactional 
values to the related tangible and intangible property.  As 
reported by him: 
(1) Comparable sale 1 was Gaz Metro Limited Partnership’s 
2007 acquisition of Green Mountain Power, which 
serviced 92,000 electricity customers, for 
$294,765,720, including $109,000,000 in assumed debt;  
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(2) Comparable sale 2 was Iberdrola, S.A.’s 2008 
acquisition of Energy East Corporation, which serviced 
2,751,000 customers, for a cash purchase of stock at 
$28.50 per share and the assumption of more than $4 
billion in debt; 
(3) Comparable sale 3 was Puget Holdings, LLC’s 2009 
purchase of Puget Energy, Inc., which serviced 
approximately 6,000 square miles of territory in the 
Washington state area, for a total consideration of 
$6,708,978,670;  
(4) Comparable sale 4 was a 2010 sale of E.O.N AG to PPL 
Corporation, which brought thirteen U.S. wind farms 
and 1900 megawatts (“MWs”) of electric generating 
capacity to the sale, for a total price of 
$7,625,000,000;  
(5) Comparable sale 5 was the 2012 sale of NSTAR, which 
served approximately 1.1 million electric distribution 
customers in eighty-two communities throughout 
Massachusetts, to NU for a total consideration of 
$7,222,249,302 which included stock consideration 
valued at $5,038,248,302 plus assumption of debt;  
(6) Comparable sale 6 was the 2012 two-step transaction in 
which Gaz Metro Limited Partnership purchased Central 
Vermont Public Service Corporation (“CVPS”) as well as 
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approximately 38 percent of CVPS’s voting common 
equity ownership in Vermont Electric Power Company, 
Inc. (“VELCO”), followed by the merger of CVPS into 
Green Mountain Power Corporation (“Green Mountain 
Power”).  CVPS had approximately 179,500 retail 
electric customers spread throughout 163 Vermont 
locales.  After the conveyance, Green Mountain Power’s 
VELCO ownership was reduced to approximately 40 
percent.  The total purchase consideration of 
approximately $729.2 million consisted of $481.2 
million in cash for outstanding stock, a $19.5 million 
reimbursement fee for termination of a previous merger 
agreement between CVPS and Fortis USA, Inc., and the 
assumption of approximately $228.5 million in debt; 
and  
(7) Comparable sale 7 was the 2013 sale of Central Hudson 
Gas and Electric, which maintained three small 
hydroelectric facilities and two small peaking 
facilities for a total capacity of 66 MWs, to Fortis 
USA, Inc. for cash in exchange for stock and 
assumption of debt totaling $1,491,298,610. 
In analyzing these sales, Mr. Sansoucy relied on six 
different units of comparison: sale price/customer; net 
plant/customer; gross revenue/customer; sale price/gross 
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revenue; sale price/adjusted net book value; and sale 
price/EBITDA.  The rows in the following table summarize the 
mean and median of these indicators, respectively. 
Electric Plant Sale Indicators 
Sale Price/ 
Customer 
Net Plant/ 
Customer 
Gross Revenue/ 
Customer 
Sale Price/ 
Gross Revenue 
Sale Price/ 
Adj. Net Book 
Sale Price/ 
EBITDA 
$4,210 $3,234 $2,045 2.07 1.30 9.58 
$4,031 $3,137 $1,994 2.04 1.29 9.78 
 
Of these indicators, Mr. Sansoucy opined that the sale-price-to-
gross-revenue and sale-price-to-adjusted-book-value ratios were 
the most useful for his sales approach analysis.       Mr. 
Sansoucy revised the adjusted net book value of the subject 
property as reported by NSTAR because NSTAR used a system-wide 
depreciation schedule, which Mr. Sansoucy argued, underestimated 
the value of the subject property in Boston because Boston had a 
disproportionate amount of new property and the depreciation 
schedule used by NSTAR measured service as opposed to useful 
lives.  The following table summarizes Mr. Sansoucy’s values for 
the subject property for the fiscal years at issue using a sale-
price-to-gross-revenue ratio of 2.6 and a sale-price-to- 
adjusted-net-book ratio and sale-price-to-revised-adjusted-net- 
book ratio of 1.6, both of which Mr. Sansoucy primarily based on 
the comparable 2.46 and 1.51 ratios from the NSTAR/NU merger.  
Mr. Sansoucy considered the subject property’s Boston location 
superior to that of the rest of the NSTAR system because it had 
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more usage per customer and more revenue per customer, as well 
as a more compact system with more growth potential.      
Mr. Sansoucy’s Sales Comparison Values Using Selected Ratios4 
 Sale Price/ 
Gross Revenue 
Sale Price/ 
Adj.Net Book 
Sale Price/Rev. 
Adj. Net Book 
Fiscal Year 2012 $1,723,000,000 $1,847,888,000 $2,093,155,000 
Fiscal Year 2013 $1,755,000,000 $1,891,381,000 $2,190,000,000 
 
Mr. Sansoucy utilized the sale-price-to-EBITDA ratio in his 
income approach as a metric for a market derived direct 
capitalization rate.     
 For his three income capitalization approaches - direct 
capitalization, yield capitalization, and regulatory 
capitalization - Mr. Sansoucy reported that he examined revenue 
and expense figures reported on NSTAR’s FERC Form 1, as well as 
information gleaned from DPU data and obtained in the discovery 
phase of this litigation.  Excluding sales for resale, Mr. 
Sansoucy determined that Boston represented 27 percent of 
NSTAR’s total revenue during the relevant time-period, and, on a 
weighted basis, Boston’s revenue per customer was 5.4 percent 
greater than the balance of NSTAR’s customers.     Mr. Sansoucy 
                                                          
4
 Mr. Sansoucy’s sales-valuation indicators erroneously contain the value of 
NSTAR’s Boston real estate, which is not at issue in these appeals.  If the 
assessed values of NSTAR’s Boston real estate are subtracted, the resulting 
values are: 
 
 Sale Price/ 
Gross Revenue 
Sale Price/ 
Adj. Net Book 
Sale Price/Rev. 
Adj. Net Book 
Fiscal Year 2012 $1,658,487,600 $1,783,375,600 $2,028,642,600 
Fiscal Year 2013 $1,675,385,300 $1,811,766,300 $2,110,385,300 
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also determined that the weighted average cost of capital during 
the relevant time-period was 7.87 percent, which he based on 
NSTAR’s regulatory earnings collar that provided for an 
allowable range of return on equity, after tax, of 8.5 percent 
to 12.5 percent - that is 2 points on either side of the 
intended 10.5 percent target - along with approved debt costs of 
5.24 percent on a 50/50 debt-to-equity ratio. 
 In his direct capitalization methodology, Mr. Sansoucy 
calculated his value estimate by applying his EBITDA multiplier 
to the allocated EBITDA or cash flow for NSTAR’s property in 
Boston.  Mr. Sansoucy selected an EBITA multiplier of 10 based 
on the 9.58 mean and 9.78 median that he developed using his 7 
selected transactions and his opinion that the Boston property, 
if sold separately from the balance of the system, would command 
a premium EBITDA multiplier in the marketplace because of its 
superior economics, compact electric operation, greater than 
average energy sales, greater than average revenue per customer, 
as well as Boston’s vibrant economy and growth, new customers, 
and likely continued growth.  Mr. Sansoucy’s EBITDA multiplier 
of 10 is also intended to reflect 17 percent greater energy 
sales and 5 percent greater revenue per customer in Boston.  His 
allocated EBITDA of approximately 29 percent to 30 percent of 
NSTAR’s total or gross revenue is based on revenue figures from 
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NSTAR and his own market study of regional utility EBITDAs.  The 
following table summarizes this approach. 
Mr. Sansoucy’s Direct Capitalization Approach 
Fiscal Year 2012 - $198,847,150 x 10 = $1,988,471,150 or $1,988,000,000 (rounded) 
Fiscal Year 2013 - $202,501,797 x 10 = $2,025,017,970 or $2,025,000,000 (rounded) 
 
 In his yield capitalization methodology, Mr. Sancoucy 
attempted to convert future benefits into present value by 
discounting each future benefit by an appropriate yield rate.  
He assumed two types of potential buyers for the subject 
property – a regulated utility similar to NSTAR or an 
unregulated utility such as a cooperative, municipal purchaser, 
or power authority.  Summaries of           Mr. Sansoucy’s 
assumptions and results from his DCF methodology are summarized 
in the following two tables, which are near reproductions of his 
tables. 
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Mr. Sansoucy’s Fiscal Year 2012 Assumptions & Results of his DCF5 
 Regulated Buyer Unregulated Buyer 
DCF Value $1,664,943,800 $2,378,635,200 
Implied Capitalization Rate 11.9% 7.0% 
Total Revenue $662,823,834 $662,823,834 
Total Expenses $463,976,684 $497,117,876 
EBITDA $198,847,150 $165,705,959 
   
Operating Expenses as % of Revenue 70.0% 75.0% 
   
Financial Assumptions   
  Capital Structure: % Debt   50.00% 100.00% 
  Capital Structure: % Equity 50.00%   0.00% 
  Debt Interest rate  5.24%   5.24% 
  Pre-Tax Cost of Equity 17.50%   0.00% 
  Effective Property Tax %  3.00%   3.00% 
  Pre-Tax Weighted Average Cost of Capital 14.37%   8.24% 
      “Rounded” 14.40%   8.20% 
  Terminal Capitalization Rate 12.00%  12.00% 
  Inflation Rate  2.50%   2.50% 
 
Mr. Sansoucy’s Fiscal Year 2013 Assumptions & Results of his DCF 
 
 Regulated Buyer Unregulated Buyer 
DCF Value $1,695,544,100 $2,422,352,600 
Implied Capitalization Rate 11.9% 7.0% 
Total Revenue $675,005,989 $675,005,989 
Total Expenses $472,504,192 $506,254,492 
EBITDA $202,501,797 $168,751,497 
   
Operating Expenses as % of Revenue 70.0% 75.0% 
   
Financial Assumptions   
  Capital Structure: % Debt   50.00% 100.00% 
  Capital Structure: % Equity 50.00%   0.00% 
  Debt Interest rate  5.24%   5.24% 
  Pre-Tax Cost of Equity 17.50%   0.00% 
  Effective Property Tax %  3.00%   3.00% 
  Pre-Tax Weighted Average Cost of Capital 14.37%   8.24% 
      “Rounded” 14.40%   8.20% 
  Terminal Capitalization Rate 12.00%  12.00% 
  Inflation Rate  2.50%   2.50% 
 
In developing his regulatory capitalization approach,       
Mr. Sansoucy challenged the assertion that regulated utility 
property is limited to its net book value.  He posited that 
                                                          
5 During his re-direct examination, Mr. Sansoucy submitted a revised 
discounted cash flow analysis for fiscal year 2012, in which he tried to 
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there are other cash flow streams that produce value for the 
utility and its stockholders that would be considered by any 
buyers of utility property.  In addition to the return on net 
book, rate payers also pay the company an amount calculated as a 
depreciation charge; accordingly, in its recovery of “expenses,” 
the company receives its return of investment in addition to its 
return on investment.  The return of the investment through 
depreciation is expensed in the electric rates charged and not 
loaded into the regulatory rate of return.  Moreover, with 
regulated utility property, the regulators also add into 
electric rates additional charges to the rate payers to 
reimburse the utility for income taxes it theoretically incurs 
on this return.  This addition results in the rate payers 
reimbursing the company at the full state, local, and federal 
rates on earnings on the book cost.  However, because the 
utility is taking accelerated depreciation on its tax return, it 
generally pays less in cash income taxes than it will collect 
from the rate payers.  Although this technically only defers the 
federal income tax, if the utility continues to invest in its 
property, this deferral will continue for decades, essentially 
generating free cash, which amounts to an interest free loan.  
Furthermore, the regulators also increase cash flow from rate 
payers by allowing rates to include an amount representing 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
account for certain but not all discrepancies revealed during cross-
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working capital for the utility.  Mr. Sansoucy posited and 
provided an example whereby regardless of the “allowed” rate of 
return, utilities generally collect between 15 cents and 20 
cents of every dollar invested every year through reimbursement 
of depreciation, money for working capital, payments in 
anticipation of income taxes on earnings, as well as the return 
on debt and return on earnings on the remaining investment.  His 
discounted cash flow analysis, which included the total stream 
of revenue benefits inuring to NSTAR from the subject property, 
was intended to demonstrate that utility property sells at a 
multiple of its book value - in this case a multiple of 1.43 of 
book value – based on a rounded book cost of $1,155,000,000 and 
a rounded total present value of cash flows of $1,649,000,000.  
Mr. Sansoucy concluded that due to the superior revenue 
generation, electric sales, growth potential in Boston, and the 
compact nature of the franchise for operations and maintenance, 
a regulatory capitalization rate of at least 1.6 times book 
value would be appropriate for the subject property.  Therefore, 
he estimated the value of the subject property for the fiscal 
years at issue using this methodology at $1,847,888,000, which 
is 1.6 times the reported book value of the subject property. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
examination.   
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The following tables summarize the values that Mr. Sansoucy 
derived using his yield capitalization, regulatory 
capitalization, and direct capitalization approaches. 
Mr. Sansoucy’s Income Approach Values for Fiscal Year 2012 
Yield Capitalization – Regulated Buyer $1,664,943,800 
Yield Capitalization – Unregulated Buyer $2,378,635,200 
Regulatory Capitalization $1,847,888,000 
Direct Capitalization $1,988,000,000 
 
  
Mr. Sansoucy’s Income Approach Values for Fiscal Year 2013 
Yield Capitalization – Regulated Buyer $1,695,544,100 
Yield Capitalization – Unregulated Buyer $2,422,352,600 
Regulatory Capitalization $1,847,888,000 
Direct Capitalization $2,025,000,000 
 
 A summary of the estimated market values for the subject 
property derived by Mr. Sansoucy’s valuation methods is 
contained in the following table. 
Method of Valuation Fiscal Year 2012 Fiscal Year 2013 
 
Cost Approach 
 
$2,338,260,300 
 
$2,495,888,400 
 
Sales Comparison Approach 
  
  Gross Revenue Indicator $1,723,000,000 $1,755,000,000 
  Book Multiplier Indicator $1,847,888,000 $1,891,381,000 
  Revised Book Multiplier Indicator $2,093,155,000 $2,190,000,000 
 
Income Capitalization Approach 
  
  Yield Capitalization – Regulated Buyer $1,664,943,800 $1,695,544,100 
  Yield Capitalization – Unregulated Buyer $2,378,635,200 $2,422,352,600 
 
Direct Capitalization Market Derived 
 
$1,988,000,000 
 
$2,025,000,000 
 
 Mr. Sansoucy determined that the average values of the 
seven indicators are $1,934,787,143 for fiscal year 2012 and 
$1,975,309,386 for fiscal year 2013, which he reconciled at 
$1,950,000,000 for each of the fiscal years at issue.  Mr. 
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Sancoucy then subtracted this reconciled value from the value 
that he derived for the subject property using his cost approach 
to calculate the 17 percent and 22 percent indicated economic 
obsolescence value for his cost approach for fiscal years 2012 
and 2013, respectively.  Accordingly, Mr. Sansoucy estimated the 
value of the subject property at $1,950,000,000 for each of the 
fiscal years at issue. 
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Relevant Regulatory Decisions 
 As a joint submission, the parties entered into the record 
an “appendix” of essentially all the relevant regulatory 
decisions from the DPU from 1993 to 2010, along with several 
other such decisions from other jurisdictions.  The assessors 
asserted that existing legal and regulatory framework 
demonstrates that: (1) the DPU’s Watertown era policy of 
refusing to permit recovery of any premium above net book that 
is paid has been abandoned; (2) the DPU has affirmatively 
allowed the recovery of money spent above net book or has 
effectively allowed it in situations where the buyer reserves 
the right to seek the premium once the predicted savings from 
the transaction have materialized and rates stay constant (“rate 
freeze”) while expenses drop; (3) the DPU has continued to 
express a policy of considering purchase price recovery, on a 
case-by-case basis, particularly when the proposed transaction 
leads to a public benefit; (4) in the case of certain proposed 
utility transactions, the DPU has justified its approval on the 
ground that the buyer would otherwise walk away and the benefits 
to the ratepayers would be lost; (5) even if the amount of the 
seller’s net book is all that goes into the buyer’s rate base, 
the premium may be recaptured as a regulatory asset or by 
allowing the buyer to keep savings or other benefits of the 
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transaction; and, lastly, (6) buyers consistently pay more than 
net book to acquire utility assets. 
 The assessors asserted that the regulatory and legal 
landscape has remained essentially unchanged since the Supreme 
Judicial Court characterized the DPU as having “declared its 
abandonment of a strict carry-over rate base policy,” which 
“amply demonstrate[s] the type of regulatory change anticipated 
in Watertown, justifying the use of a valuation methodology 
other than net book value.”  Boston Gas/SJC, 458 Mass. at 724.  
Boston Gas/SJC involved an appeal from a fiscal year 2004 
valuation.   
The assessors reviewed the several relevant DPU decisions 
since then: Joint Petition of Boston Edison Co., Cambridge 
Electric, et al. D.T.E. 05-85 (“05-85”); Joint Petition of 
Boston Edison Co., Cambridge Electric, et al. D.T.E. 06-40 (“06-
40”); and Joint Petition for Approval of Merger Between NSTAR 
and Northeast Utilities DPU 10-170B (“10-170-B”).  In 05-85 the 
companies sought approval of a rate settlement in lieu of a rate 
base proceeding.  The settlement provided for a rate increase 
and a “Simplified Incentive Plan” – a form of performance based 
rates – as well as an earnings sharing mechanism under which the 
ratepayers and NSTAR would share an excess return on equity.  
DPU approved the settlement and announced that “[a]llowing a 
settlement that departs in some particular from an enunciated 
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department policy may occur where to so allow can accommodate 
the greater good.”  05-85 at 30. 
The purpose of 06-40 was to officially merge four 
enterprises, which had already been operating under the NSTAR 
umbrella, into a single electric company – NSTAR Electric 
Company.  From an informational standpoint, the decision to 
allow the merger disclosed that there had been an aggregate 
savings of $314 million realized as of December 31, 2002 from 
the 1999 operational consolidation, as well as projected savings 
of $630 million associated with the creation of NSTAR in 1999.  
The decision also revealed that Boston Edison’s last fully 
adjudicated rate base proceeding was in 1992 - Boston Edison 
Company, DPU 92-92 (1992) - 06-40 at 66.         
10-170-B concerns the NSTAR/NU merger, which was based on a 
settlement.  The intent was for “both customers and shareholders 
receive the full value” of the merger.  While the companies 
promised not to “make any accounting adjustment that has the 
result of increasing the net book value of the utility assets 
for ratemaking purposes,” other financial benefits would 
nonetheless accrue to them, such as the ability to retain all of 
the savings created by the merger until some future rate case 
might be convened.  The DPU expressed its concern in this regard 
acknowledging that no rate case had occurred since 1992 and “for 
ratepayers to see lower costs from merger savings a rate case 
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must occur after those savings have been incurred and 
incorporated into a company’s cost of service.”  10-170-B at 62.   
The assessors further emphasized that NSTAR has been using 
a return on equity rate of 10.5 percent for many years.  That 
allowed 
rate of return includes a collar of 200 basis points around the 
10.5 percent rate, which permits NSTAR to make up to a 12.5 
percent return, with any return above 12.5 percent being split 
50/50 with the shareholders.  Both Value Line,
6
 which shows 
returns on NSTAR common equity ranging from 12.8 percent to 13.8 
percent in the previous ten years and projections of 13 percent, 
14 percent, and 15 percent for fiscal years 2011 through 2013, 
respectively, and Mr. Reed’s figures which place the returns at 
over 10.5 percent in every year but one, demonstrate that 
NSTAR’s return on equity was and is predicted to be consistently 
higher than 10.5 percent, rendering the value of the underlying 
assets significantly higher than their net book or rate base 
value. 
The assessors also addressed various other changes or 
purported changes to the regulatory setting since Boston Gas/SJC 
suggested by NSTAR.  First, Mr. Reed reported that PBR plans had 
ended, and NSTAR had agreed in a settlement to end its PBR plan.  
In Boston Gas/Board, the Board had found that performance-based 
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rates were a regulatory change since Watertown that “in many 
instances will affect the price of utility property.”  Boston 
Gas/Board, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 2009-1289.  
The Supreme Judicial Court agreed.  Boston Gas/SJC, 458 Mass. at 
724 n. 17.  Notwithstanding Mr. Reed’s assertion, the DPU has 
not issued any formal policy statement announcing its 
abandonment of PBR.  But, even assuming PBR has been abolished, 
the assessors suggested that the “earnings sharing” mechanism 
under which NSTAR operates would make an investment in the 
subject property similarly attractive.  See 05-85 discussed 
supra.   
The assessors further maintained that under the case-by-
case treatment afforded by the DPU, it has permitted improved 
post-merger earnings to be “shared” between the shareholder and 
the ratepayer.  These shared earnings are used to amortize 
transaction costs but can also be kept beyond that.  In 2005, 
for example, DPU approved a rate plan settlement in connection 
with the Boston Edison/Cambridge Electric merger.  Id.  The rate 
plan included an allowed rate of return of 10.5 percent.  
However, the approved settlement set a “collar” by which Boston 
Edison could earn up to 12.5 percent.  05-85 at p. 5.  This 
earning already exceeded what the supposed market for an 
equivalent risk would be (10.5%) but that rate plan also put in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
6 Value Line is an independent investment research and financial publishing 
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place an “earnings sharing mechanism” whereby if “NSTAR 
Electric’s aggregate return on equity (‘ROE’) for distribution 
service . . . exceeds 12.5 percent, ratepayers and NSTAR 
Electric will share the excess ROE on a 50:50 basis.”  Id.  As 
Mr. Moody testified: “In recent years, they have an agreement 
with the commission that if you can produce more benefits, then 
you will be allowed to earn more.”  Therefore, the assessors 
claim that the DPU policy expressly permits earning a rate of 
return higher than that found necessary to attract capital, 
which might induce a buyer to pay more than rate base.  Here 
“[t]he return actually being earned by the utility may exceed or 
be expected to exceed the rate of return approved in the allowed 
rate, thus tending to encourage a buyer to pay more than rate 
base.”  Watertown, 387 Mass. at 305-06.  The assessors posit 
that effectively, earnings sharing, which allows a company to 
exceed its allowed rate of return upon successful implementation 
of cost cutting, is PBR in the merger context.  In other words, 
it presents the same economics as described by the Supreme 
Judicial Court in support of its agreement with the Board in 
Boston Gas/SJC that PBR was a special circumstance contemplated 
in Watertown justifying a valuation methodology beyond net book.  
“A buyer who anticipates being able to perform more efficiently 
than is contemplated by the productivity adjustment could thus 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
firm.  
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earn a higher return than otherwise would be available under 
existing rate regulation.”  Boston Gas/SJC, 458 Mass. at 724 n. 
17.  In fact, the assessors point out that the DPU has declined 
to approve earnings sharing because a company is under PBR.  
See, e.g., 06-40 at 17 n. 14.   
The assessors emphasized another factor that leads to the 
recovery of earnings above those supposedly fixed by the DPU, 
which stem from profits rooted in the considerable savings that 
have been generated by utility sales transactions - until these 
savings are subject to earnings sharing, the company keeps them.  
NSTAR is the product of Boston Edison buying three other utility 
companies.  As of 2006, NSTAR’s original 1999 estimated savings 
from that transaction “exceeded $100 million per year,” 06-40 at 
16, n. 13, and, as of the date of the hearing in these appeals, 
it has yet to be shared with the ratepayers.  As the DPU 
acknowledged: “savings [cost reductions resulting from mergers] 
accrue to shareholders from the time such savings are achieved 
until the next rate case.”  10-170-B at 61.  By agreeing to 
“rate freezes,” the companies have successfully avoided rate 
cases.   
The assessors further maintained that, since Watertown, 
there have been “large and growing pools of capital” from hedge 
funds, pensions plans, and wealthy investors looking to invest 
in utilities and their property for the high returns and 
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relatively low risk.  In the Matter of the Joint Application of 
Puget Holdings LLC and Puget Sound Energy, Washington State 
Utilities and Transportation Commission Docket U-072375 
(“Puget”) at 59.  The 2005 repeal of the Public Utility Holding 
Company Act of 1935 (“PUHCA”) eliminated numerous obstacles to 
consolidation of the electric and gas industry by allowing 
companies operating in geographically diverse markets to merge 
and by allowing non-utility-regulated enterprises to invest in 
public utilities without having to divest unrelated holdings.  
Thakar, Nidhi, The Urge to Merge: A Look at the Repeal of the 
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, Lewis and Clark 
University (2008), pgs. 905, 933-34.  The repeal has attracted 
outside investors to the industry with “some perceiving 
convergence opportunities, some looking for the earning 
stability of regulated utilities, and others – pursuing a ‘buy 
low, sell high’ strategy – hoping to turn a quick profit on the 
assets.”  Id. at 934 (citation omitted).   
The Puget transaction discussed by Mr. Sansoucy is an 
example of how the “new money” and shrewd financial maneuvering 
has resulted in returns exceeding the allowed rate of return.  
Puget Sound Energy was purchased by a Canadian pension fund and 
infrastructure investors from Australia.  The buyers created a 
holding company (“Puget Holdings”) to inject over $3.4 billion 
in equity and then take the company private and de-list it from 
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the stock exchange.  Puget at 16.  The regulators would permit 
the equity investment to earn a return of 10 percent.  The 
investors borrowed an additional $850,000,000 at the holding 
company level and then invested it as equity into the operating 
company.  Puget at 69-70.  These funds would earn at the rate of 
10 percent but only cost an estimated 5 percent; thereby 
producing a return to the investors substantially in excess ($42 
million) of the rate of return “allowed” at the operating 
company level since their equity return greatly exceeded their 
debt cost.  As described by the Washington State Utilities and 
Transportation Commission (the “UTC”), this approach would 
“achieve a higher internal rate of return at the Puget Holdings 
level without affecting at all the rates paid by PSE 
ratepayers.”  Puget at 8.  Since the UTC concluded that 
ratepayers would be protected from exposure to the leverage, it 
determined that the investors “are entitled to the benefits of 
their election to take on the full risks of assuming debt to 
acquire equity.”  Puget at 75.  Even though the investors in 
Puget agreed to carry over the rate base and not seek their 
transactional expenses, they nonetheless will earn substantially 
more than the return “allowed.” 
Lastly, the assessors posited that there have been numerous 
other changes to rate regulation since Watertown, further 
demonstrating that utility regulation is not premised on certain 
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immutable concepts incapable of change, including: customer 
savings initiatives, which is another method of splitting extra 
revenues between ratepayers and shareholders; automatic 
inflation adjustments to permit recovery of increased expenses 
without filing new rate cases; capital cost adjustment 
mechanisms that help overcome so-called regulatory lag; and, 
most recently, decoupling that is beginning to permit utilities 
to reach their allowed returns irrespective of customer energy 
usage.  Decoupling is designed to eliminate the disincentives 
that utilities might have to promote conservation measures.   
In sum, the assessors maintained that since Watertown and 
into the time period relevant to these appeals: the DPU has 
abandoned its policy of refusing to permit recovery of any 
premium paid above net book; the DPU has affirmatively allowed 
the recovery of money spent above net book or has effectively 
allowed it in situations where the buyer reserves the right to 
seek the premium once the predicted savings from the transaction 
have materialized and rates stay constant (“rate freeze”) while 
expenses drop; the DPU has continued to express a policy of 
considering purchase price recovery, on a case-by-case basis, 
particularly when the transaction leads to a public benefit; in 
the case of certain proposed utility transactions, the DPU has 
justified its approval on the ground that the buyer would 
otherwise walk away and the benefits to the ratepayers would be 
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lost; even if the amount of the seller’s net book is all that 
goes into the buyer’s rate base, the premium is recaptured by 
allowing the buyer to keep savings or other benefits of the 
transaction; and, lastly, buyers consistently pay more than net 
book to acquire utility properties.  
The Board’s Ultimate Findings of Fact 
 Based on all the evidence, the Board agreed with the 
assessors and Mr. Sansoucy that factors referenced in Watertown, 
or equivalent factors continue to exist within the regulatory 
and legal landscape affecting regulated utilities in the 
Commonwealth, which could encourage a buyer to pay more than net 
book cost for regulated utility assets like the subject 
property.  The Board credited Mr. Sansoucy’s observations in 
finding that there are cash flow streams that produce value for 
regulated utilities and their stockholders that would be 
considered by any buyers of regulated utility property.   
As Mr. Sansoucy explained, in addition to the return on 
their investment, regulated utilities also receive a return of 
their investment through depreciation that is expensed in the 
electric rates charged and not loaded into the regulatory rate 
of return.   
The Board further credited Mr. Sansoucy’s observation that 
additional charges are added into electric rates to reimburse 
regulated utilities for anticipated income taxes.  However, 
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because regulated utilities take accelerated depreciation on 
their returns, they generally collect more from the ratepayers 
than they actually pay as tax.  This deferral of federal income 
tax, which can last for decades if the utilities continue to 
invest in their property, effectively generates more free cash.  
The Board also accepted   Mr. Sansoucy’s observation that rates 
include an amount representing working capital, further 
increasing regulated utilities’ cash flow.  The Board found 
that, regardless of the rate of return, these other cash flow 
streams would likely serve to induce a buyer of regulated 
utility property to pay more than the net book value of that 
property. 
 Moreover, the Board concurred with Mr. Sansoucy’s 
conclusions that the compact nature of and recent improvements 
to the subject property, which consists of the Boston component 
of the NSTAR electric property, present significant 
opportunities for growth and improved revenues.  Indeed, during 
the relevant time period, that growth and increased revenue 
potential manifested themselves to some extent.              
The Board additionally credited the assessors’ review and 
analysis of the regulatory and legal setting during the relevant 
time period.  Beginning with Boston Gas/SJC, the Board agreed 
with the assessors and found that the Supreme Judicial Court’s 
characterization of the DPU as having “declared its abandonment 
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of a strict carry-over rate base policy,” was still the law and, 
accordingly, still “justif[ied] the use of a valuation 
methodology other than net book value,” in the appeals at issue.  
Boston Gas/SJC, 458 Mass. at 724.  The Board further found that 
the assessors’ discussion of several DPU decisions since Boston 
Gas/SJC - 05-85, 06-40, and 10-170-B – were instructive and 
provided additional support for applying “a valuation 
methodology other than net book value.”  In particular, in 05-
85, the DPU approved a settlement in lieu of a rate base 
proceeding that provided for a rate increase, an incentive plan, 
and a mechanism for sharing any excess return on equity between 
ratepayers and NSTAR.  In addition, the DPU acknowledged in the 
decision that it might allow a settlement “that departs in some 
particular from an enunciated Department policy . . . to . . . 
accommodate the greater good.”  O5-85 at 30.   
In 06-40, it was disclosed that the 1999 operational 
consolidation of four different companies into NSTAR resulted in 
an aggregate savings of $314 million over three years, as well 
as a projected savings of $630 million.  In 10-170-B, which is 
the NSTAR/NU merger, the settlement allowed the company to 
retain all savings accrued from the merger until some future 
rate case might be convened.  As of the date of the hearing 
associated with these appeals, there has been no rate case since 
1992.  The Board found that incentive plans, sharing mechanisms, 
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and the ability to retain savings for significant periods of 
time before any sharing with ratepayers might occur could induce 
a buyer to pay more than net book value for regulated utility 
property like the subject property. 
Moreover, the Board found that the data from Value Line 
showing returns on NSTAR common equity as ranging between 12.8 
percent and 15 percent for the past ten years and several years 
into the future; Mr. Reed’s figures which consistently place 
NSTAR’s returns over 10.5 percent; the 200 basis point rate 
collar, which allows NSTAR to make returns up to 12.5 percent; 
and NSTAR’s 50:50 split with ratepayers of any returns greater 
than 12.5 percent, all support a finding that NSTAR’s return on 
equity was and is predicted to be consistently higher than its 
longstanding 10.5 percent approved return, rendering the value 
of NSTAR’s underlying distribution and transmission property 
significantly higher than its net book value.  This example also 
supports a finding consistent with the exceptions listed in 
Watertown, 387 Mass. at 305-06, that DPU policy expressly 
permits earning a rate of return higher than that found 
necessary to attract capital (10.5 percent here), “tending to 
encourage a buyer to pay more than rate base.”   
The Board also agreed with the conclusions that the 
assessors drew from their analysis of the clever financial 
maneuverings approved by the regulatory authority in Washington 
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State to purchase the utility company in the Puget transaction.  
Essentially, the investors borrowed a large amount of money at 5 
percent at the holding company level and then invested it as 
additional equity in the operating company earning 10 percent 
thereby producing a return well in excess of that “allowed” at 
the operating company level.  Once again, the ability to earn a 
higher rate of return supports a finding that the value of the 
underlying assets is greater than their rate base.   
Lastly in this regard, the assessors discussed several 
other changes to rate regulation since Watertown, such as 
customer savings initiatives, automatic inflation adjustments, 
capital cost adjustment mechanisms, and decoupling, for the 
proposition that utility regulation is not immutable and is 
subject to change.  The Board concurred. 
Mr. Moody, NSTAR’s valuation expert, conducted three 
valuation analyses in addition to his use of net book – sales, 
RCNLD, and DCF.  Mr. Moody investigated but did not develop a 
value using a sales approach and did not rely on the value 
derived from his RCNLD approach.  Rather, he relied primarily on 
the net book value of the subject property and secondarily, on 
the value that he developed using a DCF approach.  As a 
threshold matter, the Board found that Mr. Moody’s adoption of 
the values that he developed using these approaches was 
inconsistent with the Board’s findings regarding the legal and 
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regulatory landscape that existed during the relevant time 
period.  Both these approaches, as well as his RCNLD method, 
were premised on the subject property’s return being limited by 
its net book or carry-over rate base value.   
 With respect to Mr. Moody’s RCNLD methodology, and in 
particular, his physical depreciation, the Board agreed with his 
20-percent floor, which recognized the property’s continued 
ability to produce income and avoid further soft costs.  The 
Board disagreed, however, with his exclusive use of an NSTAR 
depreciation study conducted ten years earlier for rate setting 
purposes for his determination of the subject property’s useful 
lives.  The purpose of the study was to set utility rates to 
return capital to the investors over some pre-established period 
of time by including a depreciation expense in rates.  The 
study, therefore, does not measure the depreciation of property 
but rather the return of money spent on property; the number of 
years it takes to return 50 percent of the money spent in any 
account is considered the service life.  Consequently, this 
system tracks money in account balances rather than the age, 
location, or quantity of the property itself, and it 
underestimates the useful lives of the property, which Mr. Moody 
admitted “will live longer than the average” service life he 
used.  He did not effectively demonstrate how his 20-percent 
floor might address this problem.  In sum, Mr. Moody used an 
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analysis of “service life” to determine the amount of physical 
depreciation to use in his RCNLD analysis, which is a concept 
designed for a different purpose. 
 As for the economic obsolescence measurement that Mr. Moody 
incorporated into his RCNLD methodology, the Board found that 
his abiding premise – that the basis for a return from the 
subject property was limited to its net book value – was simply 
wrong here.  Moreover, the “expected levelized earnings” that he 
used to calculate economic obsolescence were unsound because 
they were derived from and infected by his flawed DCF approach 
which is discussed below.  Accordingly, the Board found that Mr. 
Moody’s economic obsolescence was greatly overstated.   
 At any rate, Mr. Moody did not rely on his RCNLD in 
estimating a value for the subject property for the fiscal years 
at issue.  With respect to his DCF analysis, it too suffered 
from a fundamental and fatal flaw; it was premised on obtaining 
net book value for the subject property.  Consequently, the 
revenue numbers and other entries that he used in his 
methodology were selected to produce the regulated return on 
rate base, which resulted in a value very close to net book 
value.  In other words, Mr. Moody essentially worked backwards 
from net book value to populate his model with the necessary 
figures and amounts to produce a value approximating net book.  
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The Board, therefore, found that the values that Mr. Moody 
derived using this circular technique were not reliable. 
 Moreover, the Board found that when it was revealed that 
one or more of the components that Mr. Moody used in his DCF 
approach were incorrect, he simply adjusted figures elsewhere in 
his methodology to produce a consistent result.  For instance, 
to correct for an incorrect tax rate and the wrong weighted 
average cost of capital, Mr. Moody changed his rate increase 
figure to adjust his revenues to achieve his predetermined 
value.  The Board found that these machinations undercut his and 
his DCF methodology’s credibility.         
 Mr. Moody’s estimated values for the subject property for 
the fiscal years at issue were based primarily on the subject 
property’s net book values and secondarily on the values that he 
derived using his DCF methodology.  The Board found that these 
estimates were not reliable because they were premised on the 
return from the subject property being based almost solely on 
the subject property’s net book value.  As has been discussed 
above, the Board disagreed with this proposition. 
 With respect to Mr. Sansoucy and his methodologies, the 
Board found that the appellant demonstrated that numerous 
shortcomings tainted his approaches and his reconciliation of 
them resulted in unreliable estimates of the subject property’s 
values for the fiscal years at issue.  Regarding Mr. Sansoucy’s 
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cost approach, the Board agreed with the appellant’s assertions 
and found that the useful lives that he used for depreciation 
purposes were not adequately substantiated with trustworthy 
factual underpinnings.  For example, the Boston pole study upon 
which he relied “to independently view and assess the 
depreciation of the . . . property in the City of Boston as 
“part of our effort to determine the estimated life of [the] 
property for purposes of appraisal” was seriously flawed.  The 
study included data on only seventy-three older poles out of 
approximately 50,000 poles in Boston, plus another twenty-two 
poles from outside Boston; the study’s purpose was not to 
examine a random sampling of poles to help ascertain an average 
useful life, but rather was intentionally skewed toward the 
population of older poles in Boston; the study did not consider 
any retirement data thereby ignoring an entire segment of poles; 
and the study contained little analysis.  The Board found that 
these shortcomings rendered the study of little use for 
determining an average useful life of poles in Boston.     
 Mr. Sansoucy maintained that he relied on two additional 
pole studies performed by his company – one from 2003 and 
another from 2013.  The 2003 study examined only 211 poles, none 
of which were in Boston, but rather in central and western 
Massachusetts and southern New Hampshire.  The Board found that 
this study, which also failed to include retirement data, 
ATB 2017-408 
 
contained a small sample size of poles in areas not comparable 
to Boston.  These deficiencies rendered it of little relevance 
here.  Moreover, this study concluded that “a 50-year life for 
poles is conservative and reasonable” and commented that poles 
located near the ocean – like those in Boston - have shorter 
lives.  Notwithstanding this conclusion and observation, the 
useful lives that Mr. Sansoucy used for NSTAR’s transmission and 
distribution poles and fixtures were seventy-five and sixty 
years, respectively, well beyond the lives suggested by this 
study.  The Board further found that the 2013 study, which was 
completed more than a year after the relevant valuation and 
assessment dates for these appeals, evaluated poles only in New 
Hampshire and also failed to include retirement data, thereby 
rendering it unreliable for determining an average useful life 
for poles here. 
 Another report that Mr. Sansoucy found “very probative” and 
“definitely considered” when estimating the useful lives of the 
subject property was the Niagara-Mohawk Power Corporation 
(“NIMO”) asset condition study.  This study involved the 
condition of existing assets of National Grid in upstate New 
York.  It did not determine the average useful lives of that 
property, and it did not include any retirement data.  What it 
did do was inventory and develop age distributions of the 
property then in existence in the NIMO system.  The Board found 
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that Mr. Sansoucy did not establish the comparability of the 
NIMO property from upstate New York to the subject property in 
Boston.  The Board further found that without retirement data, 
the study was not helpful in establishing average useful lives 
and Mr. Sansoucy’s reliance on it was misplaced.   
 Mr. Sansoucy also claimed that “substation observations” 
contributed to his determination of average useful lives.  His 
testimony revealed, however, that those observations actually 
consisted of some exterior photographs printed off of Google of 
perhaps one-third of the substations in Boston and some “over 
the fence” observations of only the “major” substations.  The 
Board found that these so-called “observations” did not provide 
credible information for determining the average useful lives of 
the substation personal property.   
 Mr. Sansoucy reported that he also relied on a statistical 
study prepared by his staff of average service lives of property 
in four transmission accounts as reported by forty-one utility 
companies from across the country in their FERC filings.  The 
study then calculated a variance in lives between 1996 and 2010 
for each company purporting to show in graphic form that average 
service life for transmission property was increasing.  Upon 
close examination of one of the accounts, the Board found that 
the depiction instead revealed that 70 percent of the companies 
reporting show either a decline or no change in average service 
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life for that account.  Moreover, the Board found that even if 
there were a trend among some utility companies toward increased 
service lives, Mr. Sansoucy did not establish that NSTAR was one 
of them.  The Board also found that in at least one of the 
accounts, the average life was not even close to Mr. Sansoucy’s 
ninety-year life, instead averaging less than fifty-five years. 
 Lastly, in setting his average useful lives, Mr. Sansoucy 
reported that he examined information relating to “the 
galvanization of the fittings and fixtures that go with poles” 
and the Wood Pole Newsletter.  The Board found that the only 
material pertaining to galvanization included with his expert 
appraisal report was a pamphlet that contained only generalized 
information about the subject and no specific information that 
might prove useful in quantifying the average useful lives of 
the subject property.  The Board also found that the newsletter 
did not contain information about the life of wood poles, only 
alternative material poles. 
 In sum, the Board found that the average useful lives that    
Mr. Sansoucy employed to calculate depreciation were not 
reliable.  They simply were not based on a credible factual 
foundation.  As a result, the Board further found that the 
depreciation that he employed in his cost or RCNLD approach was 
flawed, rendering his estimates of the value of the subject 
property using that approach unreliable and inexact. 
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 Regarding Mr. Sansoucy’s comparable sales and the 
indicators that he derived from them, the Board found that all 
of his sales were enterprise sales and not sales involving just 
the personal property of the utilities, and, moreover, Mr. 
Sansoucy did not allocate values to all of the various 
components of the sales.   Accordingly, the Board found that the 
metrics that he created from these sales were not appropriate 
ones for valuing simply NSTAR’s personal property located in 
Boston.  Furthermore, the Board found that Mr. Sansoucy’s 
purportedly comparable sales were largely not comparable to 
NSTAR and the subject property.  The appellant provided the 
Board with a table that is, in its essence, reproduced here, and 
that demonstrates the lack of comparability between these sales 
and NSTAR or NSTAR’s property in Boston.   
Sale 
# 
Company Non-Comparable Bullet Points 
 
Subj. 
Prop. 
NSTAR Electric in Boston  302,153 customers 
 Compact/dense service area (50 sq. mi.) 
 No gas 
 No generation 
 No non-utility assets 
 Net plant approx. $1.154 billion 
1 Green Mountain Power  92,000 customers 
 Net plant $226 million 
 Low density geography 
 18% generation plant 
2 Energy East  Super-regional, five states 
 7 subsidiaries 
 2.7 million customers (1.8 million 
elec.) 
 1/3 customers for gas service 
 Coal/gas/hydro generation assets 
 Telecom assets 
 Steam heating/cooling assets 
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 New England/New York service area 
3 Puget Energy  1.75 million customers 
 6,000 sq. mi. service area 
 Over 40% gas customers 
 Over 1/3 revenue from gas operations 
 Substantial generation assets 
4 E.ON/Louisville Gas & 
Elec. 
 Generation assets 
 Service in three states 
 Approx. 25% customers for gas service 
 Service area over 6,600 noncontig. sq. 
mi. 
5 NSTAR  Subject property is only the electric 
plant personal property in Boston 
 Plant in Boston is only approx. 29% of 
NSTAR Electric’s total plant 
6 CVPS  179,000 customers 
 Generation/hydro plants 
 Less consolidated service area over 163 
towns 
7 CH Energy  2,600 sq. mi. service territory 
 370,000 customers; 70,000 gas 
 19% non-utility revenues 
 
The Board therefore found that the value indicators that Mr. 
Sansoucy created from these sales were not reliable gauges for 
determining the value of the subject property because these 
sales were not comparable to the subject property.   
 Mr. Sansoucy also employed several income-based 
methodologies to value the subject property for the fiscal years 
at issue: two DCF (or yield capitalization) models, one for a 
regulated purchaser and one for an unregulated purchaser; a 
“regulatory capitalization” method; and a direct capitalization 
approach.  With respect to his DCF models, cross-examination 
revealed three fundamental errors which rendered them 
unreliable: the models were not “no growth” models as claimed; 
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they failed to depreciate the property over time; and they did 
not deduct or account for revenues attributable to other 
sources, such as real estate.  As for his “no growth” claim,       
Mr. Sansoucy increased operating revenues in both his DCF models 
by 2.5 percent per year to account for rising operating 
expenses.  However, by not precisely matching the increase in 
revenue to the anticipated increase in operating expenses, his 
“no growth” DCF models showed significant growth.  In addition, 
Mr. Sansoucy’s “no growth” DCF models failed to reduce future 
revenues to reflect the depreciation of the utility plant, which 
he attempted to justify by arguing that revenues would not 
decline because there would be future capital expenditures.  
However, his “no growth” models were premised on no future 
capital expenditures, which also failed to adequately account 
for replacements or addition due to non-recurring events, such 
as weather.  Moreover, because Mr. Sansoucy’s models do not 
deduct or account for the cash flows attributable to other 
sources, such as real estate, his models do not produce a value 
indicator for the personal property alone.   
 On re-direct, Mr. Sansoucy corrected for his “no growth” 
model showing growth by matching exactly his increase in revenue 
to the increase in operating expenses.  He did not, however, 
account for reduced revenues due to depreciation or for revenues 
attributable to other sources, such as real estate.  
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Accordingly, the Board found that his revised DCF values 
remained inaccurate.  Mr. Sansoucy then rejected his revised DCF 
model, ostensibly because the implied capitalization rate of 
14.6 percent (which he determined by dividing the first year’s 
EBITDA amount by the value resulting from this model) was too 
high and did not mirror the market, and introduced a new model 
for the hypothetical regulated buyer for fiscal year 2012.   
The Board found that his new DCF model, which relied on the 
same revenues from his old and revised models, still did not 
deduct or appropriately account for non-personal-property 
sources of revenue.  Further, the Board noted that Mr. Sansoucy 
applied an after-tax discount rate of 6.8 percent to discount 
EBITDAs each year.  The Board found that the application of an 
after-tax discount rate to a before-taxes EBITDA figure was 
improper.  The Board also found that both these errors 
artificially inflated the value of the subject property produced 
by this model rendering that value unreliable.  In addition, by 
presenting his new DCF model only for fiscal year 2012 and only 
for the regulated hypothetical buyer, Mr. Sansoucy failed to 
submit substitute values for fiscal year 2013 or for the 
hypothetical unregulated buyer. 
With respect to Mr. Sansoucy’s regulatory capitalization 
method, the Board found that this unique methodology developed 
and used as a valuation technique solely by Mr. Sansoucy also 
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contained flaws that rendered the values derived from it 
unreliable.  Perhaps the most significant flaws were Mr. 
Sansoucy’s use of a partial after-tax discount factor to 
discount pre-tax dollars, and his failure to match debt payments 
to revenue collected for those payments, both of which inflated 
the value of the subject property. 
With respect to Mr. Sansoucy’s direct capitalization 
approach, which applied a capitalization factor to a single 
year’s earnings, the Board considered the approach seriously 
flawed because it relied on a rate derived from a defective 
sales analysis (discussed, supra) and an EBITDA that included 
revenues from non-personal-property sources.  Accordingly, the 
Board found that the values developed using this technique were 
unreliable.   
Lastly, with respect to Mr. Sansoucy’s reconciliation and 
his ultimate opinion of value, the Board found that he based 
that opinion on flawed value indicators (discussed in some 
detail, supra) and he curiously gave equal weight to each of the 
seven sales and income indicators of value, despite his opinion 
that some were more probative than others and that others were 
not reliable.  Because of his reliance on such flawed 
indicators, the Board found that the indicated economic 
obsolescence values of 17 percent and 22 percent for fiscal 
years 2012 and 2013, respectively, that he developed for use 
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with his cost approach and his ultimate opinion of the subject 
property’s value for both fiscal years at issue were 
speculative, not credible, and not supportable or useful for the 
Board’s ultimate determination of value. 
Conclusion 
 In sum, the Board found that the factors referenced in 
Watertown or equivalent factors continue to exist within the 
regulatory and legal landscape affecting regulated utilities in 
the Commonwealth, encouraging a buyer to pay more than net book 
cost for regulated utility assets like the subject property.  
The appellant’s valuation expert relied on valuation 
methodologies that failed to account for the factual record and 
findings by this Board regarding the legal and regulatory 
framework during the relevant time period, and for primarily 
this reason, the Board found the values derived from the 
appellant’s methodologies unreliable.  While the assessor’s 
valuation expert honored the existence of Watertown or 
equivalent factors in his valuation methodologies, his models 
and analyses also contained numerous shortcomings and flaws that 
tainted them and his reconciliation of them resulting in 
unreliable estimates of the subject property’s values for the 
fiscal years at issue.  Notwithstanding these flaws, the 
assessors and their valuation expert did present sufficient 
credible evidence and analyses to successfully challenge and 
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refute the applicability of the appellant’s and its experts’ 
bald net book assertions.   
Accordingly, the Board found and ruled that the appellant 
failed to prove that the subject property’s assessed values 
exceeded its fair cash values for the fiscal years at issue.  
The Board therefore decided these appeals for the appellee. 
 
OPINION 
 The assessors are required to assess real estate at its 
fair cash value.  G.L. c. 59, § 38.  The standard to be used in 
determining fair cash value for taxation purposes is “‘the fair 
market value, which is the price an owner willing but not under 
compulsion to sell ought to receive from one willing but not 
under compulsion to buy.’”  Taunton Redevelopment Associates v. 
Assessors of Taunton, 393 Mass. 293, 295 (1984)(quoting Boston 
Gas Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 334 Mass. 549, 566 (1956)).  “A 
proper valuation depends on a consideration of the myriad 
factors that should influence a seller and buyer in reaching a 
fair price.”  Montaup Electric Co. v. Assessors of Whitman, 390 
Mass. 847, 849-50 (1984). 
 The burden of proof is upon the appellant to make out its 
right as a matter of law to an abatement of the tax.  Schlaiker 
v. Assessors of Great Barrington, 365 Mass. 243, 245 (1974).  
The appellant must show that it has complied with the statutory 
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prerequisites to its appeal, Cohen v. Assessors of Boston, 
344 Mass. 268, 271 (1962), and that the assessed valuation of 
its property was improper.  See Foxboro Associates v. Assessors 
of Foxborough, 385 Mass. 679, 691 (1982). 
 An owner of special-purpose property has the burden of 
proof even if the property poses unusual problems of valuation.  
Foxboro Associates, 385 Mass. at 691; Reliable Electronics 
Finishing Co. v. Assessors of Canton, 410 Mass. 381, 382 (1991); 
Berkshire Life Insurance Co. v. Assessors of Pittsfield, Mass. 
ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 1985-112, 120-21.  The 
assessment is presumed valid until the taxpayer sustains its 
burden of proving otherwise.  Schlaiker, 365 Mass. at 245.   
The taxpayer’s burden of proof may shift in certain 
instances to the assessors, such as where the taxpayer/owner of 
electric transmission and distribution property has demonstrated 
that a buyer’s return would be limited by the seller’s rate 
base.  Boston Edison Co. v. Assessors of Watertown, 387 Mass. 
298, 304-07 (1982)(“Watertown”); Montaup Electric, 390 Mass. at 
855.  The Court in Montaup Electric stated that a “taxpayer, 
which is a regulated utility, should not be required to 
establish the lack of special circumstances . . . until there is 
some evidence offered by the assessors to show that, because of 
such circumstances, the relevance of [net book cost] is put in 
question.”  Id.  However, the burden of persuasion remains on 
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the taxpayer.  First National Stores, Inc. v. Assessors of 
Somerville, 358 Mass. 554, 562 (1971).  In the present appeals, 
the Board found special circumstances existed placing the 
relevance of net book cost into question. 
 Generally, real estate and personal property valuation 
experts, the Massachusetts courts, and this Board rely upon 
three approaches to determine the fair cash value of property: 
income capitalization, sales comparison, and cost analyses.  
Correia v. New Bedford Redevelopment Authority, 375 Mass. 360, 
362 (1978).  When valuing regulated utility property, other 
valuation techniques have also proved useful in assisting in the 
determination of, or in checking, the fair cash value of 
property.  For example, in Boston Edison Co. v. Assessors of 
Boston, 402 Mass. 1, 17 (1988), a “unit cost per kilowatt hour 
method[] of valuation” was used as a check on the value ascribed 
to electric utility property.  In Boston Edison Co. v. Board of 
Assessors of Watertown, 393 Mass. 511, 513 (1984)(quoting the 
relevant portion of the code), a New York statutory mandate, 
under N.Y. Admin. Code tit. 9, §§ 197-1.1, 197-3.2 (1983), which 
provided “that the tangible property of electric corporations be 
valuated at ‘reproduction cost new, less depreciation of the 
tangible property,’” was considered, but distinguished.  In 
Tenneco, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, Mass. ATB Findings of 
Fact and Reports 1988-30, 50, the Board determined the fair cash 
ATB 2017-420 
 
value of pipeline property in Massachusetts using unit valuation 
methodology.  However, when dealing with the valuation of 
utilities, “fair market value normally cannot be determined with 
meaningful assistance from comparable sales or by capitalization 
of income.”  Boston Edison Co., 402 Mass. at 15.   
 In a regulatory environment where rates (which govern 
income) are based on a carry-over rate base, the net book cost 
of a utility property reflects its restricted earning capacity.  
See Watertown, 387 Mass. at 304-05.  Some considerations that 
support using an approach, which reaches a higher value for the 
property than net book cost, such as depreciated reproduction or 
replacement cost, are:   1) when the rate of return on an 
investment in the property is expected to exceed the current 
rate; 2) when the rate of return exceeds the market rate of 
return for an investment of similar risk; 3) when there is a 
possibility that the law or regulatory decisions might change to 
make an investment in the property more attractive; 4) when 
there is potential for utility growth; and 5) when there is a 
possibility of finding a non-public utility purchaser.  
Watertown, 387 Mass. at 305-06.   
 In the present appeals, the Board found the existence of 
special circumstances and ruled that, for purposes of property 
tax valuation, “the use of a valuation method other than [or in 
addition to] net book value [was justified].”  Boston Gas Co. v. 
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Assessors of Boston, 458 Mass. 715, 722 (2011).  The Board 
compared its findings here with those made in Boston Edison Co. 
v. Assessors of Everett, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 
1996-759, 839, 848-49, where the record established the 
existence of regulatory change and the possibility of a non-
public utility purchaser.  Based on that record, the Board used 
a blend of “depreciated reproduction cost,”7 without economic 
obsolescence, and net book cost to establish the value of Mystic 
Station in Everett.  Boston Edison Co., Mass. ATB Findings of 
Fact and Reports at 1996-810-11.  The Board similarly valued 
regulated utility property using a blended approach in Boston 
Gas Co. v. Assessors of Boston, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and 
Reports 2009-1195, 1297-98.  The record here, however, is devoid 
of reliable valuation methodologies because the appellant’s 
valuation expert did not take the existence of Watertown or 
equivalent factors into account and the assessors’ valuation 
expert made too many errors. “The consequence of the [B]oard’s 
rejections of the experts’ opinions, therefore, was that the 
taxpayer had not persuaded the [B]oard that the property had 
been overvalued and, therefore,       . . . had not carried its 
burden of proving that the assessors had overvalued the 
                                                          
7
 “Depreciated replacement cost” is synonymous with replacement cost new less 
depreciation (RCNLD). 
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property.” Turners Fall Limited Partnership v. Assessors of 
Montague, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 732, 735-36 (2002).     
“The board is not required to adopt any particular method 
of valuation.”  Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Assessors of Boston,     
397 Mass. 447, 449 (1986).  Nor is “[t]he board . . . required 
to believe the testimony of any particular witness but it [can] 
accept such portions of the evidence as appear[s] to have the 
more convincing weight.”  Assessors of Quincy v. Boston Consol. 
Gas Co., 309 Mass. 60, 72.  “The credibility of witnesses, the 
weight of the evidence, and inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence are matters for the board.”  Cummington School of the 
Arts v. Assessors of Cummington, 373 Mass. 597, 605 (1977) 
(citing Fisher School v. Assessors of Boston, 325 Mass. 529, 534 
(1950).  In the instant appeals, the Board was persuaded of the 
continuing existence of Watertown or equivalent factors during 
the relevant time period but found the parties’ valuation 
methodologies wanting for various reasons. “[T]he mere 
qualification of a person as an expert does not endow his 
testimony with any magic qualities.”  Boston Gas Co., 334 Mass. 
at 579.   
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CONCLUSION 
 Accordingly, the Board found and ruled that the appellant 
failed to prove that the subject property’s assessed values 
exceeded its fair cash values for the fiscal years at issue.  
The Board therefore decided these appeals for the appellee. 
 
 
      THE APPELLATE TAX BOARD 
 
 
 
 
      By: ________________________________ 
      Thomas W. Hammond, Jr., Chairman 
 
 
A true copy, 
 
 
Attest: ________________________ 
    Clerk of the Board 
 
